ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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
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EASTERN

F.O. 371

1947



PALESTINE

FILE NO. 951

pp. 10888 - 11093

CLOSED UNTIL

1978

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31. To			116388 2
		PALESTINE	19 NOV
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FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No: 3453

3.40.p.m.19th November 1947

19th November 1947

R. 9.18.p.m.19th November

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington Saving

110000

IMMEDIATE Giant.

The recommendations of Palestine Sub Committee 1 to the Ad Hoc Committee will take the form of a draft resolution of the General Assembly. The wording of a preamble to this resolution was discussed last night in the Sub Committee which agreed to adopt provisionally the draft set out in my immediately following telegram. This draft will be further considered by the Sub Committee this afternoon.

- 2. That the preamble should enjoin the making of recommendations to the United Kingdom as mandatory power was proposed by the United States representative, who recalled that the United Kingdom had asked the General Assembly for a recommendation. The present proposals, he said, were the answer to that request, the mandatory power had not yet asked to be relieved of the mandate and was still solely responsible for the Government of Palestine. The United Nations had "not yet accepted the gift from Great Britain" and only if the plan now proposed was resolved by the Assembly would the United Nations assume any responsibility at all.
- 3. The first draft of this preamble contained the words "takes note of the declaration by the mandatory power of its firm intention to withdraw its administration and armed forces from Palestine by 1st August 1948". The Canadian delegate (Pearson) suggested that care should be taken not to "overstate British understatements" and that the wording used by Cadogan on 13th November should be followed as closely as possible. An amendment was made accordingly.
- 4. The Jewish Agency objected to the description of the present situation in Palestine as one which "is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations" and suggested substitution of the words

"cause


"cause grave concern". This suggestion led to a long discussion as to the legality of the proposals under the Charter. Lisicky pointed out that the words objected to were taken from Article 14 of the Charter and would have to be retained so as to provide a legal basis for the Sub Committee's recommendations. Pearson indicated that in his view (which however he did not press) the preamble as drafted was not strong enough to establish a proper legal basis, and that, to provide such basis, it would be necessary for the General Assembly to state in recommendations to the Security Council that the situation in Palestine constituted a threat to the peace as defined in Article 39, and should ask the Security Council to take action under that article together with article 11(2). The United States delegate said that he could not agree with Pearson on this point and thought that Articles 10 and 14 gave all the authority necessary for their proposals. The Jewish Agency quickly withdrew their amendment.

5. There was also considerable discussion in regard to the position of the Security Council, a discussion which appeared to indicate that fundamental differences between the views of the United States and the Doviet Union in this respect have not yet been reconciled. The United States representative took the view that the Security Council would be marally bound to give effect to the proposals of the General Assembly even if a majority of that Council was opposed to the plan of partition. If validity were to depend on the approval of the Security Council, the whole plan would be placed in jeopardy. It was necessary therefore to ensure that the preamble was not so worded that it should appear that reference to the Security Council was merely in the form of a recommendation which the Security Council would be free to adopt or reject. Pearson interpolated that the Assembly could do no more than The United Kingdom representative made the recommend. factual comment that the United Ringdom delegations letter of 2nd April 1947 to the Secretary General had asked for recommendations under Article 10, to which comment the United States representative retorted (in apparent contradiction of his previous argument) that the Sub Committee was not making proposals under Article 10 but under Article 11. The Soviet delegate then proposed the following wording: "requests the Security Council to take the necessary measures provided in the plan for its implementation" but the United States representative objected to this on the grounds that the Security Council was not being asked to take any initial steps. The Venezuelan delegate suggested insertion of the word "as" before "provided", and the United States delegate accepted the clause as so amended.

Please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No: 206.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]
X:X:X:

67.4



30471 F.O.P.

E10889

20 NO / 1347

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL No. 1.

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir A. Kirkbride. D. 4.45 p.m. 18th November, 1947.

No. 347.

18th November, 1947, R. 8.28 p.m. 18th November, 1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York,
Bagdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda,
British Middle East Office Cairo,
& Saving to Beirut and Jerusalem.

TOP SECRET.

Syrian Prime Minister telephoned Samir on evening of 15th November and said that British representative at Damascus had informed him that His Majesty's Government would have no objection to the invasion of Palestine by Arab States once British forces had withdrawn. He asked Samir if he could obtain confirmation at Amman that this was the case.

- 2. I informed Samir that I could not confirm statement and that I did not believe His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires Damascus had said any such thing. I pointed out that [gp. undec.]il's request for confirmation was suspicious and would not have been made if a statement of the kind reported had been made in such unambiguous terms.
- source of this report. It occurred to me that it might be a misrepresentation of démarche made following instructions given in your telegram No. 2711 to Palestine.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda, British Middle East Office Cairo as my telegrams Nos. 19, 68, 108, 67 and 54 respectively.


Damascus please pass to Beirut as my Saving telegram No. 42.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda and British Middle East Office Cairo].

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EN CLAIR.

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO DAMASCUS.

No. 590.

D. 8.16 p.m. 20th November 1947.

20th November 1947.

Repeated to: Amman No. 508.

IMPORTANT.


Amman telegram No. 347 [of November 18th: Arab States and Palestine].

Can you explain this story?

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat.]

W:W:W:W:W

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20 am

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

20th December, 1947.

(E 10889/951/G)

IMMEDIATE

RESTRICTED

Dear Chancery,

Amman telegram No. 347 of the 18th November and our telegram No. 590 to you of the 20th. November about an alleged statement by "the British representative at Damascus" that "His Majesty's Government would have no objection to the invasion of Palestine by Arab states once British forces had withdrawn".

2. May we shortly expect your comments, as requested in our telegram under reference?

Yours ever,

EASTERN DEPARTMENT.

The Chancery,
British Legation,
Damascus.

61889

E10889

En Clair.

DEPARTMENTAL

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Breadmead, D: 4

D: 4.54 p.m. 5th January, 1947

No. 9
5th January, 1947.

R: 5.10 p.m. 5th January, 1947.

Your telegram No. 590 and your letter E10889/951/G of 20th December.

Please see Damascus telegram No. 91 to Amman of 20th Nevember. repeated to you as 517.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat].

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1 2

Nakans bodies, that the position of the U.N. is cleanly lowered if it refuses to do with its left hand what it recommends with its left night hand. But there is at least one unfortunate freculant, undulared in the course of the present session of the Assembly, in the refusal of the Security Cameil to act on the Assembly's recommendations regarding the admission of row members.

I masan 24.11.

In Fifemanice

I tum A me that the views of he all representative as let out in Janus of the tel. in 1888 are Hora, anghan m' this case; because What ha S.C. in leening arted to do is to implement a contrace of it beent * me mut eun ont be a repred. - Co Anich doubters he S.C. hand What It Bufle but shin I cannot be obliged to accede to, Inforcement I implementation is after who the J.C.'s on suchion yohere + it Cumit be bound to take action I) mut dind because anomic wyan your wants it to Doubles Countries represented in the J.C. which We have now when N.Y. for hat well in he Assembly mi favour further clarification Nhi Res? went also support it he. It Alemanically

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61

En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM N W YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No.3454

D.5.20 p.m. 19th November, 1947.

19th November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem

Washington Saving

GIANT

110398

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text.

20 NOV

The General Assembly having met in special session at the request of the Mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future Government of Palestine at the second regular session; having constituted a special committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issue relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem; and having received and examined the report of the special committee, including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the special committee; considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations; takes note of the declaration by the Mandatory Power. To plan to complete its evacution from Palestine by August 1948; and recommends with regard to the future Government of Palestine, the adoption and implementation of the following plan of partition with economic union to the United Kingdom, as the Randatory Power for Palestine, and te all other members of the United Nations. Requests the Security Council to take the necessary measures as previded for in the plan for its implementation.

Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect; and appeals to all Governments and all morples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recemmendations.

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No.207.


[Copies sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

ВВВ

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WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 3465.

D. 12.10 a.m. 20th November 1947.

19th November 1947.

R. 8.50 a.m. 20th November 1947.

Repeated to: Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

IMMEDIATE.

GIANT.

20 NOV

Following is United Nations Press Bureau summary of the report presented this evening by Sub-Committee II to the ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian question.

The report of Sub-Committee II of the ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian question submitted today to the parent Committee confines itself to three main sections namely

- 1. The legal issues connected with the Palestine problem
 - 2. The relief of Jewish refugees and displaced persons and
 - 3. The proposals for the constitution and future government of Palestine as a unitary independent state.

In its first chapter dealing with the legal issues the Sub-Committee found the proposal of the majority plan of the UNSCOP to partition Palestine contrary to the specific provisions of the Palestine Mandate and in direct violation of the principles and objectives of the covenant of the League of Nations as well of those of the United Nations Charter.

In addition the Sub-Committee found that under its Charter the United Nations would have no power to give effect to the partition plan.

The Sub-Committee based its findings on pledges given to the Arabs by the British Government during the first World War, on the Arabs claim to Palestine by reason of centuries old occupation and possession and the right of an indigenous population to self-determination. The Sub-Committee traced the history of the Palestine question back to the correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and Sharif Hussein of Mecca which was followed and explained

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by the Hogarth message, the Bassett letter, the Declaration to the Seven, General Allenby's communication to Prince Feisal and the Anglo French Declaration of 1918.

Concerning the controversy regarding the interpretation of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence and the subsequent declarations the Sub-Committee declared it could be settled only by obtaining the opinion of the International Court of Justice.

The Sub-Committee also asked for a finding by that same judicial body on the validity and legal interpretation of the Balfour Declaration and subsequently of the Mandate itself.

The Sub-Committee emphasised that this was a necessary preliminary to the formulation of any proposals for the future of Palestine.

The incompatibility of the two main objectives of the Mandate as expressed in Article 2 namely to ensure the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine and at the same time to safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants and to develop self-governing institutions in that country is considered by the Committee as the reason for the conclusion of the Mandatory Power that it is impossible to give effect to the conflicting obligations imposed by the Mandate.

In considering the Mandate the Sub-Committee stated it must be considered in the light of the covenant of the League of Nations. In accordance with the covenant's Article 22 the people of Palestine were one of the communities formerly under the Turkish Empire whose existence as an independent nation was provisionally recognised by the League subject only to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by the Mandatory Power until such time as it was able to stand alone. It cannot be suggested continued the report that the entry of an unlimited number of Jewish immigrants into Palestine or the creation of a Jewish state against the wishes of the majority of the people of Palestine was in accordance with the aims of the Mandate or the principles embedied in the covenant.

The report cited the 1939 statement of policy issued by the British Government and also the speech of Mr. Arthur Creech Jones to the ad hoc Committee on 16th October. At that time he was quoted as having said that in spite of various difficulties a national home for the Jews had been established in Palestine.

Since it said the dissolution of the League did away with the legal basis for the Mandate and

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since according to its Declaration the Mandatory Power intended to withdraw from Palestine relinquishing the Mandate, there was no further obstacle to the conversion of Palestine into an independent state.

The United Nations did not inherit the constitutional and political powers and functions of the League of Nations the report emphasised and therefore cannot be treated as the successor to the League in so far as the administration of Mandates is concerned.

In Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter the Sub-Committee found that unless and until the Mandatory Power should negotiate a trusteeship agreement in accordance with Article 79 and present it to the General Assembly for approval neither the General Assembly nor any other organ of the United Nations would be competent to entertain recommend or enforce any solution with regard to a mandated territory. (Paragraph 1 of Article 80).

Summing up this point the report declared that the dissolution of the League the consequential removal of the legal basis for the Mandate and the more recent declarations of the Mandatory to withdraw from Palestine opened the Way for the establishment of an independent government in Palestine by the people of Palestine without the intervention of either the United Nations or of any other party.

In view of this the Sub-Committee suggested that the Palestine problem be struck from the agenda of the General Assembly. In any other case it said it would be essential to obtain the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.

Considering the partition in the light of the provisions of the Mandate the covenant and the Charter the Sub-Committee pointed out that Palestine either in whole or in part could not be ceded or leased to or in any way placed under the control of the Government of any foreign power. The people of Palestine it added were to emerge as a fully independent nation as soon as the temperary limitation on their sovereignty imposed by the Mandate had ended. Again in Article 1 of the Charter the United Nations were bound to respect the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The United Nations was further limited according to the report to make a disposition or alienation of territory such as it would be making if Palestine should be partitioned. Neither, the report added, was there any justification in the Charter for the establishing of a permanent international trusteeship for the City of Jerusalem.

In discussing the proposed economic union between the Arab and Jewish states the Sub-Committee

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found that since no trusteeship agreement had been duly negotiated there was no provision in the Charter enabling or empowering the United Nations to establish a permanent trusteeship such as was implicit in the proposed economic union.

The Sub-Committee held further that acceptance of the economic union or the adoption of a constitution proposed by the UNSCOP majority could not be made a condition for the granting of independence to Palestine.

The enforcement of the majority proposals which since they would be repulsed by the Arabs would mean a "ruling by force" and was likewise ruled out as both illegal and impractical aside from being contrary to the primary object of the United Nations i.e. "to maintain international peace and security" to "develop friendly relations among the nations" and "to be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends".

The Sub-Committee reiterating the proposals of certain Delegations asked that the International Court of Justice decide not only the legality of the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration but also the competence of the United Nations to partition Palestine and to implement that partition by means of force.

The report added

"A refusal to submit these questions for the opinion of the International Court of Justice would amount to a confession that the United Nations are determined to make recommendations in a certain direction not because those recommendations are in accord with the principles of international justice and fairness but because the majority of the Delegates desire to settle the problem in a certain manner irrespective of what the merits of the questions or the legal obligations of the parties might be".

In Charter II dealing with the relief of Jewish refugees and displaced persons the Sub-Committee qualified the Jewish refugee problem as not being strictly relevant to the Palestine problem but as a factor which clouded the issue and made more difficult a just and satisfactory settlement of the Palestine problem itself.

The problem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons, the Sub-Committee reported, is an international responsibility and already recognised as such. The report suggested that a Special Committee be set up by the General Assembly to recommend for the acceptance of member nations a scheme of quotas of refugees and displaced persons to be resettled in their respective territories in cases where repatriation to their countries of origin is impossible.

The Sub-Committee's repert strongly protested against further immigration of Jewish refugees and displaced persons on legal political and economic grounds. The main political reason was that Jewish immigration into Palestine was opposed by a large majority of the population. The legal objection was based on a rule laid down by the Mandate which stated that "the rights and position" of other sections of the population are not to be prejudiced by Jewish

immigration.

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immigration. At the time the rule was made the Arabs constituted 93 per cent of the population. Today they constitute only 66 per cent which the report felt definitely did prejudice the Arab position. Another safeguard to the indigenous population was ruled at the same time by the Mandate. This prohibited Jewish immigration except "under suitable conditions". Excluding the Desert area, the report stated, Palestine has a population density of 324 persons per square mile — an extremely high figure.

On the economic objections, Sub-Committee 11's report quoted many paragraphs from the U.N.S.C.O.P. report in which the special committee regarded the economic resources and absorptive capacity of Palestine and its future economic prospects, grimly.

The chapter also mentioned that neither the Economic and Social Council nor the Third Committee proposed Palestine as a solution to the problem of Jewish refugees. Palestine the report continued had already admitted 287,000 Jews from 1933 to 1946 during which period most of the other countries together have admitted only 364,000. The Sub-Committee declared that in its opinion the question of refugees and displaced persons was indivisible in character as regards its possible solution and that there could be no question of discrimination in favour of any particular category of refugees or displaced persons.

In the third chapter, dealing with proposals for the constitution and future government of Palestine, the Sub-Committee considered favourably the proposals of Saudi Arabia and Iraq for the termination of the Mandate and the recognition of Palestine as an independent, unitary State. Such a decision, it remarked would be in accord with the wishes and aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the people of Palestine, the objectives of the Covenant and the provisions of the Mandate.

Considering the opposite or partition plan, the report said that since Palestine was the centre of communications of the Arab world and had common frontiers with four Arab States, there was no doubt that the forcible creation of a Jewish State in the heart of the Arab world would introduce a new and highly disturbing factor to the peace and security of the Middle East.

Still referring to the proposed partition the report presented a detailed analysis of population in the proposed Jewish State. In its southern section - the Beersheba area - the report said there are 1,020 Jews as against an Arab population of 103,820. In the Northern section - Eastern Galilee - the Arab population is given as 86,000, compared with a Jewish population of 29,000.

The breakdown also revealed that of the ten sub-districts

/which

which, in whole or in part, are incorporated in the proposed Jewish state, the Arabs have a clear majority over the Jews in nine. The only exception is the Jaffa sub-district which includes the all-Jewish city of Tel Aviv.

Still another fact upon which the Arabs based their opposition to the partition was the finding of the Woodhead Commission, which in 1938 was charged with making concrete recommendations for the implementation of the proposal of the Royal Commission to partition Palestine. The Woodhead Commission concluded that no partition was possible which would not leave a very substantial Arab minority in the territory to be allotted to any possible Jewish state. The proposal to partition was then abandoned by the British Government as impracticable.

However according to the Sub-Committee report the proposal of the UNSCOP majority is more impracticable and unjust to the Arabs than any of the various partition schemes considered by the Woodhead Commission. Approaching the problem from another angle, the report pointed out that the United Nations could not subscribe to the principle that a racial or religious minority, whether arising from natural development or created as a result of immigration, could insist upon the breaking up of a homeland against the wishes of the majority of the population. The acceptance the report added of such a principle would constitute a dangerous precedent which might be adopted by dissident elements in many states and thus become a source both of internal conflict and international disorder. Lack of political unity the Sub-Committee asserted would necessarily result in the lack of economic unity which the UNSCOP declared to be an essential factor in its plan.

In proposing a tentative outline for a constitution to be drawn up by a constituent assembly, the Sub-Committee proposed a law of naturalisation and citizenship which would provide that the applicant should be a legal resident of Palestine for a continuous period to be determined by a constituent assembly.

According to the Sub-Committee's plan the legislative executive and administrative functions of the present administration of Palestine would be vested in a provisional Government as soon as it would be constituted. Thereafter the Mandatory would start the withdrawal of its forces and services, a task which would be completed in one year. Such a plan would the Sub-Committee feels ensure an orderly transfer of power and at the same time would enable the provisional Government to organise its police and security forces

and

and to build up a sound administrative system on national lines.

The report added that until the independent state of Palestine legislated otherwise, immigration into Palestine would be suspended and the existing land transfer restrictions would remain in force.

The last section of the report embodied three resolutions which the Sub-Committee recommended for the acceptance of the General Assembly:

The first asked for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the controversial points mentioned in the report -

The second would have the General Assembly undertake immediately the initiation and execution of an international arrangement whereby the problem of the distressed European Jews will be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency for the alleviation of their plight and of the Palestine problem and presents the Sub-Committee's recommendations -

The third, a draft resolution on the constitution and future government of Palestine, recommended the setting up of a provisional Government in Palestine, representative of all important sections of the citizenry in proportion to their numerical strength, at the earliest possible date and possessing all the powers and functions of the present administration of Palestine. This resolution also included the following basic principles for the constitution of a democratic and unitary state of Palestine with safeguards for the political economic religious and cultural rights of the Jewish and other minerities.

state - (I) Palestine shall be a unitary and severeign

(II) It shall have a democratic constitution with an elected legislature and an executive responsible to the legislature -

(III) The constitution shall provide guarantees for the sanctity of the Holy Places covering inviolability maintenance freedom of access and freedom of worship in accordance with the status quo -

(IV) The constitution shall guarantee respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race sex language or religion and freedom of religious belief and practice in accordance with the status quo (including the maintenance of separate religious courts to deal with matters of personal status) -

- (V) The constitution shall guarantee the rights of religious bodies or other societies and individuals to maintain in addition to educational establishments administered by public authority, educational institutions of their own, subject to normal Government supervision and inspection -
- (VI) The constitution shall recognise the right of Jews to employ Hebrew as a second official language in areas in which they are in a majority -
- (VII) The law of naturalisation and citizenship shall provide amongst other conditions that the applicant should be a legal resident of Palestine for a continuous period to be determined by the Constituent Assembly -
- (VIII) The constitution shall ensure adequate representation in the legislature for all important sections of the citizenry in proportion to their numerical strength -
- (IX) The constitution shall also provide for adequate reflection in the executive and administration of the distribution of representation in the legislature -
- (X) The constitution shall authorise the legislature to invest local authorities with wide discretion in matters connected with education health and other social services -
- (XI) The constitution shall provide for the setting up of a Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of which shall include inter alia the power to pronounce upon the constitutional validity of all legislation and it shall be open to any aggrieved party to have recourse to that Tribunal -
- (XII) The guarantees contained in the constitution concerning the rights and safeguards of the minerities shall not be subject to amendment or modification without the consent of the minerity concerned expressed through a majority of its representatives in the legislature.

Attached to the report itself, as appendices, are an estimated population chart of Palestine as on December 31st, 1946 - an estimated population chart of the proposed Jewish State as on December 31st, 1946: a note on the Bedouin population of Palestine presented by the representative of the United Kingdom - a map showing the distribution of population by sub-districts - a map showing land ownership by sub-districts and extracts from village

statistics

1

statistics showing the agricultural uses to which the various village lands were put in 1945.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 209.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for retransmission to Jerusalem.]

W:W:W:W:W

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| 1 2 3 4 5 6 | Reference:- FO 371 / 61889

statistics showing the agricultural uses to which the various village lands were put in 1945.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 209.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for retransmission to Jerusalem.]

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DEPARTMENTAL NO:2

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No:3461

D 6.18 p.m. 19th November 1947

19th November 1947

R.11.58 p.m. 19th November 1947

SECRET


My telegram Ne 5450: Palestine.

- C.R.O. should know in connexion with consideration of statement to be made by United Kingdom representative in ad hoc Committee that there has been no meeting of British Commonwealth Delegations to discuss this question although all Commonwealth Delegations have indicated greatest interest. With Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, India committed to Arab side and South African Delegation under instructions to support partition, any Commonwealth meeting could only lead to wrangle if discussion developed. We have of course kept Evatt and Pearson as closely informed as possible and we should propose to communicate text of statement to them at the first possible opportunity and to all other Commonwealth Delegations under pleage of secrecy shortly before time when statement is to be made. In these circumstances C.R.O. may -
- (1) Wish to take advantage of presence in London of Mr Mackenzie King and Field Marshal Smuts to inform them personally at earliest opportunity and -
- (2) To communicate text at appropriate time and with as full explanation as possible of reasons for line taken to Commonwealth Governments by direct telegraph or in such other way as may seem most desirable

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representative on ad hoc committee introduced no new points of principle, we did not send it in advance to Commonwealth Governments.

3. New Zealand Prime Minister has now told us that he is instructing his represent-

ative to vote for (repeat for) partition.

In general, Sommonwealth reactions indicate
that they find it very difficult to appreciate
our inability to support partition, and more
particularly to implement it almost alone,
because of the disastrous effect such a
friendly
course would have on our/relations with Arab

States, and hence our whole position in the

4. Copies of relevant telegrams follow by air bag.

My 22/10

TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGI

OUT THE

Top Secret

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK
(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 4032 22nd November, 1947

IMPORTANT

TOP SECRET

Your telegram No.3461. Palestine.

C.R.O. have noted your point (1).

As regards your point (2), you should know that in addition to D telegrams on various aspects of the situation in Palestine, including substance of our telegram to you No. 3874, we have sent the four white Prime Ministers

- (a) on November 12th, the substance of our telegram to you No. 3852.
- (b) on November 14th, the gist of our telegram to you No. 5875.

We did not (repeat not) however indicate directly that we might, under certain circumstances, prefer that the Assembly should make no recommendations.

- 2. Since latest statement by United Kingdom representative on ad hoc committee introduced no new points of principle, we did not send it in advance to Commonwealth Governments.
- 3. New Zealand Prime Minister has new told us that he is instructing his representative to vote for (repeat for) partition.
 - 4. Cepies of relevant telegrams follow by air bag.

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WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel No. 6555

D. 6.10 p.m. 20th November 1947 R. 9.23 p.m. 20th November 1947

20th November 1947
Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation Not 0926

Jerusalem

IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL

21 NOV

Your telegram to United Kingdom Delegation New York No. 3980 paragraph 5: Palestine.

During recent informal conversation on Near Eastern matters, in which Palestine was briefly touched upon. Head of Near Eastern Division of State Department said that United States Government were not (repeat not) applying pressure to other Delegations in order to influence their vote. He said that he thought that the following had happened: the Zionists were putting heavy pressure upon the Latin Americans and it was probable that the latter, when challenged by the Arabs, had preferred to say that it was the United States Government rather than the Zionists who were doing this.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 101.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem].



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WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGH OFFICE (From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3471 20th Nevember, 1947.

D. 10.28 p.m. 20th Nevember, 1947

R. 3.55 a.m. 21st Nevember, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem Washington Saving

IMMEDIATE GIANT

My telegram No. 3468.

Your telegram No. 4011 was received at Lake Success while Cadegan was making his statement and too late for correction to be effected.

- 2. To a question put by Pearson with reference to paragraph 9 of the statement as to whether the "date upon which the British civil administration will be considered at an end" would also be the date of the termination of the Mandate, Cadegan replied: "In my understanding the termination of the civil administration does mean the termination of the Mandate".
- 3. In reply to a further question by Pearson as to whether there was not a contradiction between the last sentence of paragraph 5 and the penultimate sentence of paragraph 7, Cadegan said: "There is no contradiction, because it is possible that we might declare the termination of the Mandate either at a very early stage in the withdrawal or even before the withdrawal began".
- 4. Evatt then asked what was the meaning of the words "when the time came" in the penultimate section of paragraph 7, to which Cadegan replied: "It means when, and as, we evacuate territory. It could not be until after the Mandate had terminated".
- 5. The delegates of Poland and the Soviet Union said that the situation had been changed by the United Kingdom statement and requested adjournment of the Committee so as to enable delegates to consult their Governments. The United States representative suggested that the reports of the two Sub-Committees should be referred back to them for reconsideration in the light of the statement. Evatt replied that, in substance, the United Kingdom statement was simply a restatement of previous declarations but agreed that, since

/it

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it clarified a number of particular points, it was desirable that the Sub-Committees should now reconsider their recommendations. In response to a proposal by the delegate of Guatemala, Cadogan expressed readiness for a United Kingdom representative to attend Sub-Committee One so as to provide information as might be possible on points upon which further clarification might be sought.

- 6. The delegate of Nerway stated that his delegation had not been consulted in regard to the nemination of his country by Sub-Committee one for membership of the proposed Commission, that at first sight the composition suggested for that Commission did not seem entirely satisfactory and that his delegation wished to reserve its position in the matter.
- 7. The Ad Hec Committee then adjourned until further netice, with Evatt expressing the conviction that it should be pessible for it to meet again temerrew.

Fereign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 211.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem].

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In P.P. P'rline til 2237 22/11.

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFIC.

(From United Mingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3473

D. 11.47 p.m. 20th November 1947 R. 5.40 a.m. 21st November 1947

20th November 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem

Washington Saving.

IMMEDIATE.
GIANT
SECRET

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My telegram No. 3471.

Palestine Sub-Committee 1 met in private session this afternoon to consider modification of their report in light of Cadogan's statement before Ad Hoc Committee. reply to questions Cadogan described course of events contemplated (as understood by him). He said he did not know date of termination of Mandate but it would probably not be in very immediate future and military might have cleared some areas before then. In areas evacuated we should at once hand over to United Nations Commission without asking what they proposed to do. It would be their task to provide for the administration in such areas. This withdrawal would be progressive and we should try to keep the Commission informed beforehand regarding its stages. In areas not evacuated we should be in the position of an army of occupation governed by the customary code of military law applicable to such a régime.

- 2. Soviet representative asked if only two changes in the plan of implementation were contemplated -
- (a) that where, under the plan, administrative powers were described as transferred to Jewish and Arab bodies they should instead be transferred by the Handatory to the Commission and
 - (b) that the transfer should be pragressive.

Martin (who had taken Cadogan's place) agreed these were the principal points but added that to meet the United Kingdom point of view, it would be necessary also to remove the references to the Security Council and Trusteeship Council in

/paragraphs...



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paragraphs A1 and A2 of Part 1 of the plan of partition (see my telegram No. 3423). As regards the last sub-paragraph of B2, B5 and B4, he indicated that in the areas remaining under military control anything done or allowed by military administration must be subject to the overriding requirements of maintenance of law and order.

- Jarious revisions of Part 1 of the plan of partition were suggested by Pearson (Canada) and other members to remove inconsistency with United hingdom attitude as indicated by Cadogan's statement. At the end of the meeting a note of these was circulated which it was agreed to consider further temorrow marning.
- 4. Chairman asked if United Kingdom representative had any comment on the aragraph regarding withdrawal from a scapert in the Jewish State by 1st February 1948 (see my telegram No. 3447). Martin replied that he had received no instructions on this point but that in any case the plans for withdrawal were not yet complete. He suggested omission of the reference to a definite date. Chairman said with some heat that he had understood that Cadogan's statement expressed the final comments of the United Kingdom Government on the proposals and now it appeared that they had not expressed their views on a very important point: it was most unsatisfactory. Pearson reminded him that this had been a late addition to the draft and the Mandatory Government had not had much time to consider it. Please telegraph urgently your instructions as to any further reply to be given if the matter is raised again.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 213 Immediate.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

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INWARD TELEGRAM

This document must be paraphrased if the communication of its contents to any person Cypher (0.T.P.) outside Government Service is authorised.

TO THE SECRETARPADESTREE (COROTAL STORIES unningham)

TO S. OF S. COLONIES.

D. 22pd November, 1947 R. 22nd 18.50 hrs.

10930 951 31

No. 2237 Secret

Addressed S. of S.

Repeated to U.K. Delegation No. 1621 (S. of S. please pass).

U.K. Delegation telegram No. 3475 to Foreign Office (your No. 2919 to me).

Withdrawal.

First paragraph. I find it hard to visualise the practical implications of statement given in this paragraph. For instance, its wholly Arab Gaza district is first to be evacuated by the Army (by 1st February). By undertaking given we are committed to hand over this district to a United Nations Commission as soon as the Army (repeat Army) leaves but, in fact, we contemplate continuing civil administration since withdrawal of the Army does not in any way affect civil administration in this area. Moreover, from a practical angle I cannot see how any U.N. Commission could administer a part of Palestine and particularly a part where they would be boycotted, if, indeed, their lives were not in danger. It is also imperative for us to know what the words "hand over" in this context mean in practical terms.

/Paragraph 4.

- (a) that so long as H.M. Government continues to hold mendate they must insist on individual control of the country.
- that the Handstory Power must retain its full Buthority until the moment at which the mandata is brought to an end.
- (c) transfer of responsible civil administration sust be effected in one operation. See paragraphely and 7 of UKDEL telegram to Foreign Office No. 3450 (your No.2901 to me).

Proposal to "evacuate" sea ports while the mandate is in being is inconsistent with these declarations and should be resisted. While it may not be possible to provent illegal immigration via Tel Aviv after ist February, it is clearly desirable to maintain Customs if only to prevent import of arms into the Jewish area while equivalent facility to denied to the Arabe. (I infer that addition to A2 of draft Report of No. One Sub-Committee contained in UKDEL to Poreign Office telegram No.3447 (your No.2892 to me) implies deletion of proposal that a sea port in the terribby of each (repest each) proposed State shall be evacuated at an early date. Otherwise the purpose of the addition is not readily intelligible).

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WORLD OF GANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3468

D. 5.33 p.m. 20th November 1947.

20th November 1947.

R. 11.55 p.m. 20th Nevember 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem Washington

IMMEDIATE GIANT

Palestine.

Following is text of speech delivered by Sir Alexander Cadogan to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine question beginning at approximately 3.15 p.m. local time.

[Begins]

The Committee has before it the results of the work of three Sub-Committees. I regret that you Sir were compelled to report that no progress had been possible in the direction of conciliation between the two peoples most directly concerned with the future of Palestine. In the absence of any direct contact between Arabs and Jews, or any prospect of mediation between them, the problem remains one of exceptional difficulty. It can hardly be imagined that the proposals made by Sub-Committee I would commend the acquiescence of the Arab population, or that the proposals of Sub-Committee II would be accepted by the Jewish population of Palestine.

- 2. It is not for me to take part in the Committee's discussion of the merits of the proposals made by these two Sub-Committees for the future Government of Palestine. We have hoped that the United Nations may be able to find a solution which we failed to find. What I must do is address myself to the part which is assigned to my Government in carrying out the Sub-Committee's proposals.
- to participate in giving effect to any settlement which fails to win approval of both Arabs and Jews in Palestine were clearly defined by the Colonial Scoretary in the statement which he made to this Committee on the 26th September. My Government have not since deviated and cannot deviate from the position which he announced at

that

that early stage in the Committee's discussions, and my task today is simply to apply the general principles contained in the Colonial Scoretary's statement to the specific proposals which are now before you. It will be remembered that those principles were

- (i) that His Majesty's Government could not play a major part in the implementation of a scheme that was not acceptable to both Arabs and Jews;
- (ii) that they would however not wish to impede the implementation of a recommendation approved by the General Assembly.
- Before examining the reports of the two Sub-Committees in the light of my Government's policy, I should like to submit that the statement made by Mr. Creech Jones on the 26th September introduced a new factor into the problem of applying in Palestine any selution recommended by the General Assembly. My Government have since assumed that the Assembly, in drawing up its proposals, would take full account of the risk of strife in Palestine and of the need to provide means of filling the gap in the process of enforcement left by the decision of the present mandatory power that its troops could not be used as the instrument of the United Nations for this purpose. I hope that that assumption was well-founded, but I feel bound, lest there be any misunderstanding, to make clear the extent to which the rele assigned to my Government by Sub-Committee I is compatible, and beyond which it is not compatible, with the declared intentions of my Government. It will then be for the Committee to decide to what extent these prepesals are successful in meeting the problem of enfercement as it will exist in Palestine during the coming months. I shall deal with the problem in accordance with the chronelegical order of the steps proposed by the Sub-Committee.
- 5. In Part I of their report, paragraph A. 4, the Sub-Committee have defined the period of transition as the period between the adoption of recommendations by the General Assembly and the establishment of independent Arab and Jewish States. Thus the period of transition may begin in a few days time. It follows that at the outset my Government will still hold the Mandate for Palestine, and will still be responsible for discharging the obligations laid upon them by the Mandate. The Sub-Committee nevertheless propose in paragraph B.2 of Part I, that "the administration of Palestine during the transitional period shall be entrusted to the Commission". I am sure

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there is no need for me to labour the argument that no better way could be found of creating confusion and disorder in Palestine than to establish an authority which would operate concurrently with the existing mandatory administration. Even in a stable political situation, confusion of authority is dangerous. In Palestine it would obviously have disastrous consequences. I am therefore instructed to leave the Committee in no doubt that, so long as my Government continue to held the Mandate for Palestine, they must insist upon their undivided control of that country.

- 6. Having said that, I should at once make it no less clear that my Government have every right to relinquish the Mandate at a very early date. In determining this date, they will certainly give proper consideration to such arrangements as may have been made by the United Nations for the establishment of a provisional régime to succeed the Mandate. At the same time I am sure the Committee will agree that there is no reasonable basis for the suggestion that my Government must await the approval of the Security Council before exercising their right to lay down a Mandate which has proved to be unwerkable and of which they desire to divest themselves as rapidly as possible.
- 7. With reference to the termination of the Mandate, it is provided in paragraph B.13 of Part I of the report that "there shall be a progressive transfer from the Mandatery power to the Provisional Councils of Government and the Joint Economic Board respectively, of responsibility for all the functions of Government". The transfer of authority by the Palestine Government directly to Councils of Government or any other local representatives under a scheme of partition would in practice amount to the implementation of this scheme by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, which failing Arab-Jewish agreement they are not prepared to undertake. If a scheme of partition were approved and a United Nations Commission set up as proposed in the Sub-Committee's report it would be to this Commission that the Palestine Government would when the time came hand ever its authority. The Commission could then transfer authority to appropriate local bodies.
- 8. After authority had been handed ever to the United Nations Commission there would still be zones in which British troops would remain pending final withdrawal. Within these zones the paramount concern of the British authorities will be to expedite their own withdrawal from the country. If only for that purpose

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alone, our forces might have to take action for the maintenance of order. Prevention of sabotage etcetera and they would not be able to permit activity in the zones of a nature calculated to provoke disorder and se to delay British withdrawal. They will in no circumstances allow their forces to be used for the attainment of any other purpose. It is our object, one that I think will meet with general approval, to withdraw the last British ferces from Palestine as speedily as possible. Here again we see no reason to await the approval of the Security Council, as is suggested in paragraph A.2 of Part I of the document before us. If the object of this provision is to ensure that there would be no delay in our departure, then I can assure the members of the Sub-Committee that their metive is identical with that of my Gevernment. We shall move as quickly as is practicable. What we fear is the possibility that, if other parties must participate in determining the date of our departure, there may be unnecessary delays. I can however assure the Committee that we shall endeavour to keep the United Nations Commission informed beforehand of our intentions regarding the stages of our withdrawal.

9. To summarise this statement of my Government's intentions, they will in due course announce a date upon which the British civil administration will be considered at an end. After that date apart from those British authorities who will be exercising strictly limited functions in certain areas, there will be no regularly constituted authority unless the United Nations can fill the gap. It is for the Committee to recommend in what way this gap can be effectively filled. If that problem is solved there should be no great difficulty in making arrangements consequent upon the subsequent stages of our military retirement from the country.

It will not be necessary for me to comment at equal length on this document, because it will be clear to the Committee that the policy of my Government would equally preclude them from playing the part assigned to them in the plan for a unitary Palestine. It will be seen from the first three paragraphs of the recommendation on page 60 of the report that under these proposals a provisional Government of Palestine would be installed before the withdrawal of British forces and services began, and that the powers and functions of the present administration of Palestine would thereupon be vested in the provisional Government. Sub-Committee II have not proposed the

formation

formation of a United Nations Commission to supervise the implementation of their plan. If the Assembly decided to establish a Commission for this purpose, the attitude of my Government towards it would be identical with that which I have already outlined in relation to the Commission proposed by Sub-Committee I. Without the intervention of such a Commission, it will be evident I think, that my Gevernment would inevitably be drawn as a major participant into the implementation of a plan which, like that of Sub-Committee I, would not command general consent in Palestine. In any event, it fellows from what I have already said that, if the Assembly were to adopt these recommendations, my Gevernment would carry out its withdrawal from Palestine without assuming any responsibility for the establishment of the new regime. In this case also, I must therefore draw the Committee's attention to the gap in relation to enforcement which is left by the recommendations as they new stand.

[Ends].

Fercign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 210.

[Copies sent to Telegram Section, Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem].

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UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENT

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C.B.—Do not remove this slip when entering.

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I.O.C.(N.Y.)(47) II (94), 20th November, 1947.

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION

TO THE

UNITED NATIONS

ADVANCE CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY ADVANCE CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

The following is the text of a speech to be delivered by Sir Alexander Cadogan to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question Thursday, November 20th, 1947.

CAUTION: THIS TEXT SHOULD NOT BE USED IN ANY WAY

UNTIL DELIVERY HAS BEGUN

The Committee has before it the results of the work of three sub-committees. I regret that you, sir, were compelled to report that no progress had been possible in the direction of conciliation between the two peoples most directly concerned with the future of Palestine. In the absence of any direct contact between Arabs and Jows, or any prospect of mediation between them, the problem remains one of exceptional difficulty. It can hardly be imagined that the proposals made by sub-committee I would command the acquiescence of the Arab population, or that the proposals of sub-committee II would be accepted by the Jewish population of Palestine.

- 2. It is not for no to take part in the Committee's discussion of the merits of the proposals made by these two Sub-committees for the future government of Palestine. We have hoped that the United Nations may be able to find a solution which we failed to find. What I must do is address myself to the part which is assigned to my Government in carrying out the Sub-committee's proposals.
- participate in giving effect to any settlement which fails to win approval of both Arabs and Joss in Palestine were clearly defined by the Colonial Secretary in the statement which he made to this Committee on the 26th September. My Government have not since deviated, and cannot deviate, from the position which he announced at that early stage in the Committee's discussions, and my task to-day is simply to apply the general principles contained in the Colonial Secretary's statement to the specific proposals which are now before you. It will be remembered that these principles were:
- (i) that His Majosty's Government could not play a major part in the implementation of a scheme that was not acceptable to both Arabs and Jews;
- (ii) that they would how over not wish to impede the implementation of a recommendation approved by the General Assembly.
- 4. Before examining the reports of the two Sub-committees in the light of my Government's policy, I should like to submit that the /statement

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statement made by Mr. Creech Jones on the 26th September introduced a new factor into the problem of applying in Palestine any solution recommended by the General Assembly. My Government have since assumed that the Assembly, in drawing up its proposals, would take full account of the risk of strife in Palestine and of the need to provide means of filling the gap in the process of enforcement left by the decision of the present mandatory power that its troops could not be used as the instrument of the United Nations for this purpose. I hope that that assumption was well-founded, but I fool bound, lost there be any misunderstanding, to make clear the extent to which the role assigned to my Government by Sub-committee I is compatible, and beyond which it is not compatible, with the declared intentions of my Government. It will then be for the Committee to decide to what extent these proposals are successful in meeting the problem of enforcement as it will exist in Palestine during the coming months. I shall deal with the problem in accordance with the chronological order of the steps proposed by the Sub-committee.

5. In Part I of their report, paragraph A.4, the Sub-committee have defined the period of transition as the period between the adoption of recommendations by the General Assembly and the establishment of independent Arab and Jewish states. Thus the period of transition may begin in a few days' time. It follows that at the outset my Government will still hold the mandate for Palestine, and will still be responsible for discharging the obligations laid upon them by the mandate. The Sub-committee nevertheless propose, in paragraph B.2 of Part I, that "the administration of Palestine during the transitional period shall be entrusted to the Commission". I am sure there is no need for me to labour the argument that no better way could be found of creating confusion and disorder in Palestine than to establish an authority which would operate concurrently with the existing mandatory administration. Even in a stable political situation, confusion of authority is dangerous. In Palestine it would obviously have disastrous consequences. I am therefore instructed to leave the Committee /in no

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in no doubt that, so long as my Government continue to hold the mandate for Palestine, they must insist upon their undivided control of that country.

- that my Government have every right to relinquish the mandate at a very early date. In determining this date, they will certainly give proper consideration to such arrangements as may have been made by the United Nations for the establishment of a provisional regime to succeed the mandate. At the same time I am sure the Committee will agree that there is no reasonable basis for the suggestion that my Government must await the approval of the Security Council before exercising their right to lay down a mandate which has proved to be unworkable and of which they desire to divest themselves as rapidly as possible.
- 7. With reference to the termination of the mandate, it is provided in paragraph B.13 of Part I of the Report that "there shall be a progressive transfer from the mandatory power to the Provisional Councils of Government and the Joint Economic Board respectively, of responsibility for all the functions of government". The transfer of authority by the Palestine Government directly to councils of government or any other local representatives under a scheme of partition would in practice amount to the implementation of this scheme by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, which failing ArabJewish agreement they are not prepared to undertake. If a scheme of partition were approved and a United Nations Commission set up as proposed in the Sub-committee's report it would be to this Commission that the Palestine Government would when the time came hand over its authority. The Commission could then transfer authority to whatever local bodies they chose.
- 8. After authority has been handed over to the United Nations Commission there would still be zones in which British troops would remain pending final withdrawal. Within these zones the paramount /concern

concern of the British authorities will be to expedite their own withdrawal from the country. If only for that purpose alone, our forces might have to take action for the maintenance of order, prevention of sabotage, etc. and they would not be able to permit activity in the zones of a nature calculated to provoke disorder and so to delay British withdrawal. They will in no circumstances allow their forces to be used for the attainment of any other purpose. It is our object, one that I think will meet with general approval, to withdraw the last British forces from Palestine as speedily as possible. Here again we see no reason to await the approval of the Security Council, as is suggested in paragraph A.2 of Part I of the document before us. If the object of this provision is to ensure that there would be no delay in our departure, then I can assure the members of the Sub-committee that their motive is identical with that of my Government. We shall move as quickly as is practicable. What we fear is the possibility that, if other parties must participate in determining the date of our departure, there may be unnecessary delays. I can, however, assure the Committee that we shall endeavour to keep the United Nations Commission informed beforehand of our intentions regarding the stages of our withdrawal.

9. To summarise this statement of my Government's intentions, they will in due course announce a date upon which the British civil administration will be considered at an end. After that date apart from those British authorities who will be exercising strictly limited functions in certain areas, there will be no regularly constituted authority unless the United Nations can fill the gap. It is for the Committee to recommend in what way this gap can be effectively filled. If that problem is solved there should be no great difficulty in making arrangements consequent upon the subsequent stages of our military retirement from the country.

10. I turn now to the report of Sub-committee II. It will not be necessary for me to comment at equal length on this document, because it

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will be clear to the Committee that the policy of my Government would equally preclude them from playing the part assigned to them in the plan for a unitary Palestine. It will be seen from the first three paragraphs of the recommendation on page 60 of the report that under these proposals a provisional government of Palestine would be installed before the withdrawal of British forces and services began, and that the powers and functions of the present administration of Palestine would thereupon be vested in the provisional government. Sub-committee II have not proposed the formation of a United Nations Commission to supervise the implementation of their plan. If the Assembly decided to establish a Commission for this purpose, the attitude of my Government towards it would be identical with that which I have already outlined in relation to the Commission proposed by Sub-committee I. Without the intervention of such a Commission, it will be evident, I think, that my Government would inevitably be drawn as a major participant into the implementation of a plan which, like that of Sub-committee I, would not command general consent in Palestine. In any event, it follows from what I have already said that, if the Assembly were to adopt these recommendations, my Government would carry out its withdrawal from Palestine without assuming any responsibility for the establishment of the new regime. In this case also, I must therefore draw the Committee's attention to the gap in relation to enforcement which is left by the recommendations as they now stand.

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Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

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En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3472

D. 9.06 p.m. 20th November, 1947

20th Nevember, 1947.

R. 5.25 a.m. 21st November, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington Saving

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

10884

My telegram Ne. 3449.

The rapporteurs of Palestine Sub-Committees 1 and 2 presented their reports to the Ad Hoc Committee last night.

- 2. In reply to a question from the delegate of Venezuela as to the results of the work of the Sub-Committee of reconciliation, Evatt replied that he and the Vice Chairman and the Rapporteur had not overlooked their work; contacts had been made and there had also been written communications but these were of a nature which made it impossible to give particulars. Everything had been done that could be done to bring the parties together but there were no indications of a successful result.
- 3. When the Ad Hec Committee resumed this merning Pearson, at Evatt's request, gave a brief explanation of Sub-Committee One's proposals for implementation, which he claimed to be "workable at least on paper". He said that there were two main features of the plan
- (a) a commission should be appointed by the Assembly but operate under the guidance of the Security Council, it being understood that the Security Council would not issue instructions to it which were at variance with the recommendations of the Assembly, nor interfere with its day to day activities
- (b) a timetable which had been influenced by the decision of the Mandatory to withdraw by 1st August. The Sub-Committee, he said, had in mind a progressive withdrawal and a progressive transfer of authority, the particulars of which could be worked out by the Mandatory with the United Nations. No transfer of authority except by progressive stages was practicable and in this connexion paragraph B.2 should be read together with paragraphs B.12 and 13. (See my telegram No. 3423).





4. After the Chairman of Sub-Committee 1 had made some comments on the proposed boundary modifications the delegate of Pakistan put a number of questions, of which the following were among the most cogent

- (1) What were the reasons for the boundary modifications? The report did not give any. How much scope was left to the Arab State for economic development?
- (2) On what legal basis did the powers of the proposed commission rest?
- (3) In regard to the exprepriation of lands (last section of Chapter 2 of the Declaration), was it thought that the fixing of compensation by the Supreme Court of the State in which the land lay was a sufficient safeguard?
- (4) Had Sub-Committee I given any consideration to the problem of refugees or to the legal issues which had previously been raised by Arab delegates in the Ad Hoc Committee? These questions were within the competence of the Sub-Committee under their terms of reference.

He also put questions in regard to populations, land holdings, the cutting of Arab village lands, the division of the customs surplus and the composition of the proposed commission.

5. The Lebanese delegation put the following four additional questions.

- (1) Sub-Committee 1 had recommended that a United Nations Commission should have powers of control from the outset, including powers of legislation. It would thus have powers which the General Assembly had not got. How could this be reconciled with the views expressed by the delegates of the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia in regard to other problems such as Korea that the Assembly had no authority under the Charter to amend [gp. undec.] Committee of Investigation?
- (2) How was it proposed to ensure freedom of transit between enclaves?
- (3) Was not the proposal in paragraph B.12 that the Mandatory power "shall maintain order and direct the main public services" in flagrant contradiction of the statements made to the Committee by the United Kingdom representative?
- (4) In regard to section B.14 would there not be danger of differences of opinion between the Assembly and the Security Council, differences which could only lead to

/confusion

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confusion in Palestine?

6. The delegate of the Netherlands asked for a precise definition of the word "militia" and the delegate of Iraq asked how the United Nations Commission would keep order in the Arab areas if the Arabs, who, it was known, were against partition, refused to cooperate in the raising of militia and the establishment of a provisional council. In that event would Jewish militia be used to keep order in the Arab areas; and, if so, how did Sub-Committee 1 think that would affect the Middle East?

7. When the Chairman asked Pearson to reply to the question in paragraph 4 (2) above the latter said that it had been the other members of the working group on implementation and not he who had felt convinced that their proposals were within the provisions of the Charter and asked that questions in regard to the legal basis of the Sub-Committee's recommendations should not be put to him.

8. In regard to possibilities for economic development in the Arab State the Chairman of Sub-Committee 1 replied that Western Galilee and the Gaza coastline gave opportunities for agricultural development and that there were great possibilities for industrial development by exploitation of the minerals of the Dead Sca. As regards the other questions put both he and the Rapporteur of Sub-Committee 1 asked that these should first be put in writing. Both these delegates then hastened to suggest that it was desirable that an early statement should be made by the United Kingdom and, in response to an enquiry from the Chairman, the United Kingdom representative indicated that he would be able to make a statement this afternoon.

9. The delegate of Iraq volunteered a denial of newspaper reports that it was the intention of Arab delegates to filibuster.

Fercign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 212.

[Copies sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

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WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No:3480

D.12.08 p.m. 21st November 1947

21st November 1947

R.5.25 p.m. 21st November 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington Saving

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

110057

(22 NOV

My telegram No:3471.

Palestine.

After the adjournment of the Main Committee in the afternoon of the 20th November Sub-Committee Two held a closed meeting at which questions were put to the United Kingdom observer.

- 2. The Arab delegates directed particular attention to the statement in Cadogan's speech that the Palestine Government "would hand over its authority" to the United Nations Commission. They asked by what right the Mandatory proposed to do this and whether it implied acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the view that the Assembly could legitimately establish a Commission having powers which the Assembly itself did not possess. The United Kingdom observer assured the Sub-Committee that Cadogan's statement was not intended to imply either acceptance or rejection of any opinion concerning the legal powers of the Assembly. With regard to the right of His Majesty's Government to transfer their authority he doubted whether any precise juridical meaning should be read into the words "hand over". The position would be that the Mandatory power would terminate its responsibilities, that the United Nations would meanwhile have made arrangements for filling the void and that in withdrawing the Mandatory authorities would take cognizance of those arrangements.
- Kingdom observer said that the Mandatory administration would retain exclusive control so long as the Mandate lasted. There would be no British control over territorial waters except presumably those adjacent to the zones of military occupation after the end of the Mandate. This answer provoked a number of supplementary questions on which the United Kingdom observer remarked that there was no essential difference between sea frontier and a land frontier. Both would be treated in accordance with the same principles.
- 4. Asked by a member of the Pakistan delegation what the plans of His Majesty's Government were in the event of a failure by the Assembly to reach a decision the United Kingdom

/observer

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observer said that they would still aim at the target date of 1st August for the completion of their withdrawal. The date for terminating the Mandate might be affected but otherwise their plans would be the same. So long as they remained in control of the country they would be prepared to de anything in their power to facilitate agreement between Arabs and Jews. If no such agreement were reached the population of Palestine would have to determine its own future alone.

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WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3490.

D. 11.36. p.m. 21st November 1947.

21st November 1947.

R. 5.15. a.m. 22nd November 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem, Washington, Saving.

IMPORTANT

GIANT

1.10072

24 NOV

My telegram No. 3472.

Palestine.

Sub-Committee One, after concluding its discussion of implementation on afternoon of 21st November, began to consider its replies to fourteen questions submitted in writing by delegation of Pakistan.

- 2. First two questions read as follows: (1) Which are articles of Charter which confer upon General Assembly and Security Council the power to exercise all the authority which the report assumes resides in those organs? (2) What is source from which proposed United Nations Commission would draw its authority to exercise executive, legislative and administrative functions?
- J. Chairman (Pruszynski) had prepared a strikingly unconvincing reply, based on Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter. Herschel Johnson expressed satisfaction with this draft, until it was criticised by Pearson, whereupon he fell back on doctrine that, if "two-thirds of the world" made a recommendation, it automatically became lawful.
- 4. At this point the Secretariat was called on for assistance. Stavropoulos, who had been legal adviser to UNSCOP, expressed opinion that the two questions were difficult to answer because there was no article in the

/Charter



Charter to which Sub-Committee could appeal. On other hand it would be unreasonable to conclude that the family of nations could not implement its decisions.

5. Pearson then put forward view that a way out of the difficulty could be found by invoking the authority of Security Council under Articles 39 and 41. Security Council could be requested to empower commission to take action recommended by Assembly. But Herschel Johnson smelt a rat in Article 39, and Sub-Committee then accolaimed a suggestion made earlier by Tsarapkin that chairman should answer the questions in his personal capacity.

Granados, who reminded members that their chairman, at last meeting of ad hoc committee, had asked for time to consult them on the answers. If he now gave them in a personal capacity, it would be inferred that Sub-Committee were not in accord. Fabregat suggested he should say that they were unanimous in believing that their proposals had a legal basis, although they were not in agreement as to what it was. Pearson thought it would be better to say that there was more than one legal basis to choose from. Chairman urged his colleagues not to convey to press idea that they felt any doubt as to their position. They could rely on him to find a formula which would not suggest lack of agreement. They could now adjourn and, he added, relax.

Foreign Office please pass immediate Jerusalem as my telegram No. 216.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGH OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3495 22nd November, 1947 D. 11.50 a.m. 22nd November, 1947 R. 5.13 p.m. 22nd November, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem and Washington Saving

IMMEDIATE GIANT 1.10075

My telegram No. 3471.

24 NOV

Palestine.

At yesterday afternoon's meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee Pruszynski reported that Sub-Committee One had in the reexamination of their report had assistance from the United Kingdom, but that all the necessary information had not yet been revealed to them and they were therefore not yet in a position to report back to the Committee. Chamoun retorted that the statement made on Thursday by the United Kingdom representative had not differed in substance from previous statements and accused Sub-Committee One of pursuing obstructionist tactics. This retort provoked from Pruszynski a remark to the effect that the accusation of the delegate of the Lebanon should more properly be levelled at a certain great power.

- 2. The Lebanese delegate put three questions to the United Kingdom representative:-
- (A) Did the statement in Cadogan's speech of Thursday, that the Palestine Government would hand over authority to the United Nations Commission, imply acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the view that the Assembly had power to establish a commission with authority which the Assembly itself did not have? Martin replied that Cadogan's statement was not intended to imply any acceptance or rejection of any opinion as to the legal powers of the Assembly. In talking of the "handing over" of powers no precise juridical meaning was intended. The United Kingdom would lay down their responsibilities under the mandate and the United Nations would meantime, if the Sub-Committee's plan were adopted, have appointed a commission which would be in a position to take them up; there would be nothing in the nature of an apostolic succession.
- (B) So long as the mandate lasts will Great Britain continue to control immigration under the present regulations? Martin replied that in areas of which the mandatory power remained in control the present system (repeat system) of control of immigration would remain in force. What happened outside these areas would not be the concern of the United Kingdom in any greater degrees that it would be that of other nations.
- (C) Could the mandatory power in the light of ofts experience of thirty years administration find my of justification from the historical or any other point of

view for a partition plan which provided for the division of the land of fifty-four villages? Martin replied that it would not be proper for him to express an opinion on the merits of this or any other particular feature of the Sub-Committee's proposals since it was not for the United Kingdom delegation to prejudge the issue. He pointed out however that there would be certain administrative difficulties arising from such a partition and that the separation of villagers from their lands would undoubtedly have a disturbing political effect.

tative for full and detailed reasons for the mandatory powers' conclusion that the mandate had proved unworkable. How was it that such a strong and great power whose ability and capacity in administration was so well known had failed in this matter? Who was responsible? In reply Martin referred the delegate to the document entitled "Political History of Palestine under British Administration", which was in the hands of all delegations.

4. The delegate of Sweden in a speech commenting on Sub-Committee One's recommendations for Jerusalem (see my telegram No. 217 to Palestine), proposed the following amendments:-

- (A) In section C2 the deletion of the words "and chosen whenever possible from the residents of the city on a non-discriminatory basis".
- (B) In the third sentence of section D substitution of the word "re-examination" for "revision".
- (C) In the fourth sentence of section D substitution of "to possible modification" for "to the continuation or modification".
 - (D) Deletion of the last sentence of section D.

5. The Ad Hoc Committee was then adjourned until today to allow time for Sub-Committee One to revise the implementation clauses of its report and prepare answers to Zafrullah Khan's questions.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 218.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem]

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24 NOV

1947

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TELEGRAM/FROM

No. New York

Dated 3497

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WORLD ORGANISATION
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FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No.3497 22nd November, 1947. D. 4.10 p.m. 22nd November, 1947.

R. 10.20 p.m. 22nd November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem,
Washington. Saving.

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

My telegram No.3473.

Sub-Committee One of Palestine Committee yesterday morning continued (in private session) consideration of modifications of Part I of plan of partition in light of Cadogan's statement of 20th November.

- 2. Herschel Johnson (United States) asked if mandatory Government would leave some of the police and civil servants in the evacuated areas so as to keep order while Commission moved in. In Jerusalem there was possibility of widespread disorders and time was required for Government to recruit preposed special force: it was essential that British should not leave until they could hand over to an organised group. "There is a job to be done" he continued and described as "not good enough" suggestion Martin had made (in reply to a question) that if Commission wanted to deal with boundary questions during a visit to an area still under British Control this would probably have to be confined to study of maps. He suggested that mandatory would retain responsibility for administration until provisional councils were in a position to take over.
- 3. In reply Martin said that Johnson's statement had made very clear the difficulty with which the Assembly was faced and which had perhaps been pushed into the background in recent discussions. It was desirable that it should now be brought into the foreground and it was the time to speak quite frankly. Johnson had described "a job to be done" and the United Kingdom had made clear as early as the Colonial Secretary's statement of 26th September (from which they had not since deviated) that they would not undertake that job

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as Cadogan had pointed out they had assumed that Assembly would take account of risk of strife in Palestine and the need to fill gap in process of enforcement left by the decision of the mandatory that its troops could not be used as instrument of United Nations for this purpose. They had in fact not filled that gap and so long as they were not prepared to undertake the responsibility themselves they were in no position to describe the line taken by the United Kingdom as "not good enough". Cadegan had made absolutely clear the extent to which the role assigned to the United Kingdom by the Sub-Committee was compatible with the declared intentions of the United Kingdom Government. The mandatory would retain responsibility for law and order within the areas of which in the process of withdrawal it remained in control. For what happened outside these areas it accepted no responsibility at all.

4. Pearson thanking Martin for his statement expressed regret that United Kingdom had not been invited some weeks ago to take part in the discussions on implementation. As regards Martin's point that other countries should be ready to assume obligations he thought this had to some extent been provided for in paragraph B.4 in that the recommendation of the General Assembly would be binding upon the members of the Security Council. He hoped that the United Kingdom would now be able to give some assurance that they would co-ordinate their plans for withdrawal with those of the Commission and would facilitate preparatory action by the Commission. He suggested the following addition to the end of paragraph B.2. an addition which was not adopted:-"The mandatory power in areas which remain under its control shall not obstruct or impede the action of the Commission rovided that such does not cause disruption of law and order".

5. Herschel Johnson denied that the United States were trying to impose on the United Kingdom a responsibility which other nations were not willing to assume. It was simply a question of interlocking withdrawal with the new administration. The United Kingdom held the mandate but she now wanted to give it up and get out. She had a perfect right to do this but in doing so she must be prepared to co-ordinate her plans with those of the United Nations. There were still certain basic questions which had not been answered by the United Kingdom and without these answers the United Nations could not proceed with their plans. Could a more precise indication be given of the date for termination of the mandate and would the United Kingdom co-ordinate its plans with those of the United Nations? If the Commission was to assume responsibility for administration upon termination of the mandate it must first set up a shadow organisation in readiness to take over. To enable it to do this the co-operation of the mandatory power we necessary and what was wanted now was an assurance that such co-operation would be given. The United Kingdom was merely being asked to acquiesce in the decisions of the United Nations and not to assume responsibility for them.

6./...

6. Lisicky gave his view that the meeting had been useful since it had elicited pertinent questions from the United States and pertinent and frank answers from the United Kingdom. He regretted that there had been no such frank speaking a little earlier. He would now speak frankly himself. There was one point about the Sub-Committee's plan which worried him. It was proposed to vest the Commission with very heavy responsibilities without giving it adequate means of enforcement. At Dumbarton Oaks many delegates had lauded the advantage of the Charter over the Covenant of the League of Nations in that it provided a means of enforcement. But the plan of the Sub-Committee made no such provision and the result might be that the proposed Commission would become a mere puppet of one of the parties of the dispute against the other. It seemed to him that not only the security of Palestine was at stake but the whole prestige of the United Nations Organisation. There was a second point which was not clear to him. Sir A. Cadogan had said that the mandatory power reserved full powers until the mandate was terminated throughout the whole country. How could this statement be reconciled with the proposed redraft of paragraph B.12 which proposed that in the period before the termination of the mandate "the mandatory power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces". Finally it seemed to him that the co-operation asked for by the Sub-Committee from the mandatory power was in fact co-operation in enforcement of their plan. If the plan was to succeed it must have such co-speration. Before proceeding to elaborate it they must know clearly the extent to which they could expect that co-operation.

7. Martin after admitting that on points of detail it had not been possible to give a clear indication of the United Kingdom's plan since his Government were themselves feeling their way through the intricacies of the problem created by the decision to withdraw said that nevertheless as regards enforcement of any plan the United Kingdom's position had been made crystal clear from the beginning. The United Kingdom's statements had been ignored; he noted however from the present discussion and in particular from the helpful contribution of the delegate of Czechoslovakia that the Sub-Committee had now got back to a more realistic approach.

8. Johnson referring to Lisicky's point about paragraph B.12 asked Martin whether it would not be necessary to delete the words "in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces" if this paragraph were to be made to correspond to the United Kingdom's plan. Martin replied that the plans of his government had not yet been fully elaborated but that in his understanding it was intended that there should not be withdrawal from any area/...

area until the mandate had been terminated. He undertook to ask his Government for further information on this point and as to the date for termination of the mandate. As regards the last paragraph of B.2. which required the mandatory not to prevent the implementation of the plan by the Commission he would not attempt to define the extent to which it would be possible for the mandatory to co-operate by allowing Commission to take preparatory steps. He wished to make it clear however that in any case the activities of the Commission within any area in which the mandatory was still responsible for law and order would be greatly limited; as an example of the obvious need for such limitation he sketched a picture of the situation which might arise should the Commission attempt to demarcate a boundary in one of the areas where village lands were divided between the two states a situation which would immediately call for military action. Summing up the position the United Nations Commission would in Herschel Johnson's own words be taking a risk by sending a Commission without means of enforcement. Here was the gap in the plan; there would always be a risk so long as the gap remained. The question was whether the United Nations were prepared to take that risk.

9. Granados then launched a long attack against the obstructive attitude of the United Kingdom. He stated that the gap in the plan was simply due to the United Kingdom's negative attitude; all that was wanted was a place in Palestine to organise a militia; once established a militia would take care of the problem. The United Kingdom was behaving not like a good member of the United Nations but like a "scornful child". (An expression which the Chairman asked Granados to withdraw which he did with an apology).

not agree to deletion of the last sentence of B.2. since this deletion would destroy the full effect of the provisions preceding it. The proposal to delete it was obnoxious. The United States delegate suggested that the Sub-Committee should take a risk and go ahead with the plan revised as in the text contained in my immediately following telegram. His Government was prepared to accept and defend that text.

ad hoc Committee when Sub-Committee adopted revisions in Part I of plan of partition given in my immediately following telegram. Martin suggested omission of words "in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces" but this was opposed by Soviet delegate (who had been instructed by his Government to approve the amendment as drafted) and by Canadian delegate and was not accepted.

12. The Jewish Agency was excluded from the morning's discussion but admitted in the afternoon.

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[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for onward transmission to Jerusalem].

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WORLD ORGARASANON DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No.3498 22nd November, 1947.

D. 3.00 p.m. 22nd November, 1947.

R. 8.27 p.m. 22nd November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem,
Washington Saving.

IMMEDIA TE

GIANT

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of revisions adopted yesterday by Sub-Committee One.:-

A.1. The mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1st August, 1948.

A.2. The armed forces of the mandatory power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine. The withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1st August, 1948.

The Mandatory power shall advise the Commission as far in advance as possible of its intention to terminate the mandate and to evacuate each area.

B.2. The administration of Palestine shall as the mandatory power withdraws its armed forces be progressively turned over to the Commission which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly under the guidance of the Security Council. The mandatory power shall to the fullest possible extent co-ordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated.

In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required.

The mandatory power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly.

B.6. The provisional council of government of each state, acting under the Commission shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that state in the period between the termination of the mandate and the establishment of its independence.

B.7./...

B.7. The Commission shall instruct the previsional councils of government of both the Arab and Jewish states, after their formation, to proceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local.

B. 12. During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the mandate, the mandatory power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces.

B.13 With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of administrative services and that on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandator; the whole administration shall be in charge of the provisional councils and the joint economic board respectively acting under the Commission there shall be a progressive transfer from the mandatory power to the Commission of responsibility for all the functions of government, including that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory power have withdrawn.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No.221.

[Copies sent to the Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

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30471 F.O.P

1.11001

[This telegram is of particulen sucrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Dundas,

D. 6.34 p.m. 22nd November, 1947.

No.521 22nd November, 1947.

R. 8.55 p.m. 22nd November, 1947.

Repeated to Cairo,
Jedda,
Bagdad,
Beirut,
Jerusalem,

New York (UKDEL)
B.M.E.O.Caire,
Amman, Saving.

Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Saving.

SECRET

Your telegram No.587.

Today I went carefully over points contained in your telegram under reference with Syrian Prime Minister. He asked what action we would take if fighting broke out in the parts of Palestine we had evacuated while we still remained elsewhere in the country. I reminded him that we counted on the Arabs not to make our task harder and said my personal view was, that any premeditated Arab intervention in any part of Palestine at a time when our administration or forces still remained in any other part of the country would be most likely to cause trouble in [? gp.emitted] in which we remained; any such action would almost certainly make our task harder.

Foreign Office please pass to UKDEL New York as my telegram No.12.

[Repeated to UKDEL New York]

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30471 F.O.P

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Dundas.

No.522

22nd November, 1947.

R. 9.03 p.m. 22nd November, 1947.

Repeated to Bagdad.

Beirut.

Cairo.

Jedda.

Jerusalem.

B.M.E.O.Cairo.

New York (UKDEL)

Amman Saving.

Amman Saving.
Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Saving.

CONFIDENTIAL

During my conversation with Jamil Mardam set out in my immediately preceding telegram he told me that (a) name of the frontier force would be changed to Palestine frontier force, that it would be paid for by Arab League when we ceased to pay for it and that it would be used to defend both Arabs and Jews in Palestine (b) Iraqi troops would be entering Transjordan within a few days to take up position directly near the Palestinian frontier.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No.13, Cairo please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No.87.

[Repeated to UKDEL New York].


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E.11002/951/31.

Confidential.

En clair.

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN NO. 522 BAGDAD NO. 1079

D. 11.45 p.m. 27th November, 1947.

Repeated to Damascus No. 44 Saving
Beirut No. 61 Saving
Cairo No. 162 Saving
Jedda No. 37 Saving
Jerusalem
B. M. E. O. Cairo No. 27 B. M. E. O. Cairo No. 249 Saving New York (U. K. Delegation No. 295 Saving Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.

Addressed to Amman telegram No. 522 of November 27th and to Bagdad, repeated Saving to Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda, B. M.E. O. Cairo, New York (U.K. Delegation) and to Jerusalem, Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.

Please telegraph comments on item (b) of Damascus telegram No. 522 [of 22nd November: Arab plans about Palestine].

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

1.11003

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United 4 Nations)

No. 3491. November 21st, 1947. D. 11.59.p.m. November 21st,1947. R. 5.30.a.m. November 22nd,1947.

IMPORTANT.

GIANT.

Your telegram No. 4013.

Beckett has commented as follows on telegram under reference:-

- 1. Glad to see that our views are same on main issue, namely
- (A) that position of British forces in Palestine after termination of mandate would be that of military forces of occupation of parts of the territory; and
- (B) the steps which they will take to render possible fulfilment of their military task cannot find their legal justification under Palestine order in Council.
- 2. Doubtful whether it is correct for His Majesty's Government to revoke any part of Palestine order in Council on relinquishing mandate. Am inclined to consider that this is a step which should be left to those taking on administration of country.
- military authorities in Palestine after termination of mandate shall be on a basis which cannot be questioned in British courts. Is it not case, however, that defence "act of State" will be perfectly satisfactory except in relation to any complaints by British subjects. If this is not enough, am inclined to consider United Kingdom legislation as next best thing. Am doubtful whether it will be practicable to obtain express grant of powers from United Nations Commission.

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En clair.

WORLD ORGANISATION OF ISAR BUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO HIGH COMMISSIONER JERUSALEM

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 217.
21st November, 1947. R. 9.05 a.m. 22nd November, 1947.
21st November, 1947. R. 9.05 a.m. 22nd November, 1947.

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 3492
Washington - Saving

My telegram 196.

1. Following is text of recommendation of Sub-committee One in regard to the administration of Jerusalem.

- A. The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the administering authority on behalf of the United Nations.
- B. The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which to be Abu Dis, the most southern Bethlehem, the most western Ein Karim (including also the built up area of Motsa) and the most northern Shufat.
- C. The Trusteeship Council shall within five months from the approval of the present plan elaborate and approve a detailed statute of the City which shall contain inter alia the substance of the following provisions:
- 1. Government machinery: special objectives.
 The administering authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives.
- (A) To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the City of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world Christian, Jewish and Moslem, to this end to ensure that order and peace and especially religious peace reign in Jerusalem.
- (B) To foster co-operation among all the inhabitants of the City in their own interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land, to promote the security well-being and any constructive measures of development of the residents having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various peoples and communities.
 - 2. Governor and administrative staff.

A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality. He shall not however be a citizen of either state in Palestine.

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The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the City and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of administration including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever possible from the residents of the City on a non-discriminatory basis. A detailed plan for the organisation of the administration of the City shall be submitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.

3. Local autonomy.

- (A) The existing local autonomous units in the territory of the City (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local Government and administration.
- (B) The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of special town units consisting respectively of the Jewish and Arab sections of New Jerusalem. The new town units shall continue to form part of the present municipality of Jerusalem.

4. Security measures.

- (A) The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarised, its neutrality shall be declared and preserved and no para-military formations exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders.
- (B) Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-co-operation or interference of one or more sections of the population the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of the administration.
- (C) To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order and especially for the protection of the Holy places and religious buildings and sites in the City the Governor shall organise a special police force of adequate strength the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force.

5. Legislative Organisation.

A Legislative Council elected by adult residents of the City irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation shall have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measures shall however conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the statute of the City or shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them. The statute will grant to the Governor a

/right

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A S 6 Reference:- EO 371 61889

right of vetoing the bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It will also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the Council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functions of the administration.

6. Administration of Justice.

The statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system including a Court of Appeal. All the inhabitants of the City shall be subject to it.

7. Economic union and economic régime.

The City of Jerusalem shall be included in the economic union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom as well as by the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in the territory of the City.

The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the conomic union on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination for all members of the United Nations and their nationals.

8. Freedom of transit and visit: control of residents.

Subject to considerations of security and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into and residence within the borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigration into and residence within the borders of the City for nationals of other states shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.

9. Relations with the Arab and Jewish States.

Representatives of the Arab and Jewish states shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their states and nationals in connexion with the international administration of the City.

10. Official languages.

Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the City. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages as may be required.

11. Citizenship.

All the residents shall become ipso facto citizens of the City of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or if Arabs

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or Jews have filed the notice of intention to become citizens of Arab or Jewish states respectively according to Part 1 Section B paragraph 9 of this plan.

The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for Consular protection of the citizens of the City outside its territory.

12. Freedoms of citizens.

l. Subject only to the requirements of public order and morals the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, language, education, speech and press, Assembly and Association and petition.

2. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex.

3. All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

4. The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests including endowments shall be respected.

of public order and good Government no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or eleemosynary bodies of any faith or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

6. The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish community respectively in its own language and its cultural traditions.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the City may impose shall not be denied or impaired.

7. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

13. Holy Places.

1. Existing rights in respect of Holy places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired,

2. Free access to the Holy places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order decorum.

shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair the Governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

4. No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City.

14. Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine.

1. The protection of the Holy places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the Governor.

2. With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the City the Governor shall determine on the ground of powers granted to him by the constitutions of both states whether the provisions of the constitutions of the Arab and Jewish states in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected.

3. The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine.

In this task he may be assisted by a Consultative Council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.

[? grp.omtd. ? 15.] Duration of the special régime.

The statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council on the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1st October, 1948. It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years unless the Trusteeship Council finds it necessary to undertake a reexamination of these provisions at an earlier date.

After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to a revision by the Trusteeship Council in the light of the experience acquired with its functioning. The residents of the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to the continuation or modification of the regime of the City. If expressed by a majority of two-thirds their wishes shall be duly considered.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem.
[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem]

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INWARD TELEGRAM

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Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 24th November, 1947, R. 24th " 18.00 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2251 Top Secret and Personal.

(Please pass to U.K.D.E.L. as No. 1628).

Your tolegram No. 2941 repeating U.K.D.E.L. telegram to Foreign Office No. 3492.

I have in various messages referred to obligations, which in my opinion we cannot escape, laid upon us to ensure that, whatever happens in the rest of Palestine, Jerusalem and the Holy Places should not be left in jeopardy by our withdrawal. Your telegram No. 2941, except in important matters of citizenship, is broadly in consonance with our own views on the future of the City. It would appear that there is now an opportunity to lift this particular question out of the stew-pot of bitter political controversy raging on the future of Palestine as a whole. Is it not possible that whatever way the voting goes in Assembly, the establishment of an international regime for Jerusalem as envisaged in your telegram should be agreed upon and its formation proceeded with at once? Affiliation to the nucleus (?Government) requires to be set up before our withdrawal from the City which might affect suggested (corrupt group (timing) out I do not foresee any great difficulty in handing over the City.

object to serving under an international body not directly concerned with political solution of Palestine problem. They

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371 61889

would/

would, however, have to be commanded by a British Commander. Even if they were to be on a temporary basis I believe they could be found,

I cannot over-stress urgency and importance everyone of us here attaches to safeguarding of the Holy City, apart from the cartain justified condemnation from the Christian world which would inevitably ensue should we fail in this duty and Jerusalem be (corrupt group ?descerated).

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for conward transmission)

Distributed to: -

R. 245 Secretary of State Sir T. Lloyd Mr. Recs-Williams Sir S. Caine Sir C. Jeffries Mr. Holding Mr. Martin Foreign Office

Cabinet Offices

Ministry of Defence

Mr. Trafford Smith Mr. Gutch Mr. Mathieson Mr. Highen Mr. Galsworthy

Mr. Holmer Mr. Mbson

Mr. Dale

Mr. Boith. Mr. Burrows. Mr. S.E.V. Luke. Commander Evershed. Brig. Comwall-Jones.



INWARD TELEGRAM

1990

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S. COLONIES.

D. 26th November, 1947. R. 26th " 13.25 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2262 Top Secret.

Addressed U.K.D.E.L. New York No. 1362.
Repeated to the S. of S. (Please pass to U.K.D.E.L.)
Washington No. 270.

Further to my telegram No. 2251 regarding Jerusalem. Today press reports that scheme described in your telegram No. 3492 to Foreign Office has been smended so as to provide

- (a) that the city shall be perpetuelly under an international regime;
- (b) for deletion of clause which would have permitted eitizens of Jerusalem by a two thirds majority to vote for a new regime in ten years time. There, is, however, said to be new provision that the people of Jerusalem may vote after ten years on possible modifications in administration.

2. I think that you should know that all indications here go to show that the Jews will do their utmost to obtain control of the city. Fairly reliable information indicates that they have already made plans for transfer to Jerusalem of 50,000 workers and Rokach has stated that Tel Aviv could never claim to be the capital of the Jewish state, a privilege reserved for Jerusalem. If amendments referred to in the first paragraph have in fact been made, chief danger that the city may be absorbed by Jewish state has been averted but you may wish to take suitable occasion to ensure that provision about referendum on administration matters is so framed as to preclude

possibility/

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possibility that it may be used to permit achievement of Jewish aims to make Jerusalem a Jewish city.

5. From the angle of Christendom, the worst that could happen to Jerusalem would be that it should come under Jewish control.

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for transmission to U.K.D.E.L.)

Distributed to:-

R. 243 Secretary of State Sir T. Lloyd Mr. Rees-Williams Sir S. Caine Sir C. Joffries

Mr. Holding

Foreign Office Cabinet Offices

Ministry of Defence

Mr. Martin

Mr. Trefford Smith

Mr. Gutch Mr. Mathieson

Mr. Highem Mr. Galeworthy

Mr. Holmer Mr. Gibson Mr. Dele

Mr. Beith. Mr. Burrows.

Mr. S.E.V. Luke.

Commander Evershed. Brigadier Cornwell-Jones.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

CORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM ME / YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

D: 11.22 a.m. 22nd Nevember, 1947

Repeated to: Jerusalem and Saving Washington

MOST DEEDIATE

GIANT

SCRET

Your telegram No. 4025.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to parry questions designed to extract further details of our plans for withdrawal and in particular as to the date for termination of the mandate and as to whether there are likely to be areas from which we would withdraw before the mandate terminated. It would ease position here if before monday you could authorise United Kingdom representative to say something more definite on these points.

2. The crux of the matter as now seen by the jewish agency is whether or not the jewish area from which we withdraw our forces in the first stage would be contiguous to an area under Arab control and thus exposed to Arab attack from the outset. We must therefore expect continued pressure from them and their supporters until they obtain some assurance on this point.

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 219 and 7.

[Copies sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference:- EO 371 61889

Minutes.

Par well

MINES

New York telegram No. 3496 of November 22nd:

Palestine.

I have discussed this telegram with Mr. Burrows in the light of Sir A. Cadogan's request that the United Kingdom Representative should be authorised before Monday to say something more definite about our withdrawal plan.

The position here is that the Chiefs of Staff have asked the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, and the High Commissioner to work out a further plan providing for a quicker withdrawal into enclaves. This plan cannot be received and discussed in London until the middle of this week.

I submit a draft telegram to New York.


NB Sir A. Cadogan's reason for pressing us for a reply is not a particularly strong one. Jewish pressure in the United States, where Jewish organisations are strongest, is bound to be exerted on us to the utmost and the announcement of a plan will not diminish it. It will merely turn it from a request for a plan into detailed criticism of those aspects of the plan which are disagreeable to the Jews.

J. S. Benis

(J.G.S. Beith)

23rd November, 1947.

Dicursed with Mr Wright. Fel rent Papel



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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 4060

D. 8.35a.m. 24th November, 1947

24th November, 1947.

Repeated to Washington No. 12100 Jerusalem

MOST IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Your telegram No. 3496 [of November 22nd: Palestine].

I appreciate the difficulty of your position, but regret that in spite of most intensive work here and in Middle East It seems impossible for us to send you any further definite information on withdrawal plan before Thursday.

INWARD TELEGRAM

11005 91-1 11 PW

Cypher (0.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S. COLONIES.

D.23rd November, 1947. R.23rd " "

18.00 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 2239 Top Secret.

Addressed to U.K.D.E.L. New York No. 1625 (S. of S. please page).
Repeated to the S. of S.

. /

Your telegram No. 3496 to the Poreign Office.

our views on actual process of withdrawal are given in my telegrams Nos. 1600 and 1621 to New York (2210 and 8237 to the Colonial Office) on assumption that date of the termination of the mendate would be 15th May. I should hepe to maintain civil administration in all areas up to about the date. Whether this will be practicable will depend upon system and cannot be predicted. I again emphasise that evectation of an area by the military forces does not necessarily entail withdrawal of civil administration. For example, it is necessary to maintain civil administration in the Gaza district to keep the railway running, if for no other reason.

2. First etage of withdrawal of military forces would be from Gaza district and not from Jewish areas. Second stage (March - May) would be withdrawal of forces from all areas except part of Samaria and Galiles and Haifa anclaws. Those plans do not ?formulate any distinction between "contiguous" areas and others, military requirements of operation of withdrawal being paramount.

(Copies sent to Porsign Office Cypher Section for transmission to New York)

Distributed to:-/

Distributed to:-

R.243
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Mr. Ress-Williams
Sir S. Caine
Sir S. Caine
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding
Mr. Martin
Mr. Gutch
Mr. Traiford Smith
Mr. Mathicaon
Mr. Higham
Mr. Galsworthy
Mr. Holmer
Mr. Gibson
Mr. Dale Foreign Office

- L. J. g. S. Bullows.

Distributed to:-

R. 243
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
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Mr. Holding
Mr. Martin Mr. Gusch Mr. Traiford Smith Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Highem
Mr. Galeworthy
Mr. Holmer
Mr. Gibson Mr. Dale Foreign Office

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

WORLD OR CANISATION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No.3513 23rd November, 1947.

D. 8.50 p.m. 23rd November, 1947.

R. 2.00 a.m. 24th November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem.

Washington Saving.

IMMEDIATE GIANT

My telegram No.3512.

Palestine.

Evatt adjourned ad hoc committee last night until temorrow (Monday) morning stating that the only delegations left to speak were those of Argentine, Mexico, Soviet Union, Egypt, Guatemala, Pakistan, Uruguay and the Lebanon. He hopes to reach a vote by temorrow night.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No.229.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem].

QQQ



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Cypher/OTP

WORLD OR ATISMON
DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No.3513 23rd November, 1947.

D. 8.50 p.m. 23rd November, 1947.

R. 2.00 a.m. 24th November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem.

Washington Saving.

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Palestine.

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Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No.229.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem].

QQQ



Reference:-	371 / 61889		
		6 Reference:-	

Cypher/OIP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

FROM BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE, CAIRO, TO 1 1008

No. 579

D. 9.45 a.m. 22nd WardmhNOV 1947.

22nd November, 1947.

R. 10.28 a.m. 22nd November, 1947.

Repeated to: Amman

From Clayton.

Transjerdan Minister at Cairo came to see me with a suggestion that an alternative plan for Palestine might be early annexation of the whole of Palestine to Transjerdan with provision for sufficient additional immigrants to make a proportion of two Arabs to one Jew in the whole enlarged Palestine: Since the population of Transjerdan is, he claimed, about 600,000, this would mean 200,000 additional immigrants. He said some Arab States would agree to this though Saudi-Arabia and Syria might oppose.

2. His idea was that proposal should be jut up by France or China as disinterested parties.

3. I said I did not (repeat not think it would be accepted to by the Jews but any solution which all parties accepted would naturally be welcome.

4. I asked him if he was making this suggestion entirely of his own initiative and he said he was and that neither the King nor Prime Minister had any knowledge of it. He was anxious that no one should know he had made it.

5. Suggestion appears unrealistic as it burks the whole question of a Jewish State but it may, despite his denial. have been inspired.

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EN CLAIR.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO HIGH COMMISSIONER, PALESTINE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 222.

November 23rd, 1947.

R: 8.30 p.m. November 23rd, 1947.

R: 8.40 p.m. November 23rd, 1947.

Repeated to <u>FOREIGN OFFICE NO. 3506</u>, Washington (Saving).

GIANT.

Following suggested amendments to report of Sub Committee One were tabled yesterday by Netherlands Delegation.

(A) Section B 3 of Part 1 to read as follows:

"On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish states and the city of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless the boundaries as described in Part 11 of this plan are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary".

(B) Section in Chapter 2 of the Declaration to be reworded as follows:

"No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish state (by a Jew in the Arab state)(*) shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be paid previous to dispossession. No sale of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish state (by a Jew in the Arab state)(*) shall be allowed unless the owner or his tenants at the moment of the sale retain thereafter an area adequate for his or their subsistence and that of his or their families".

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

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| 1 2 3 * 5 6 | Reference:- FO 371 61889

11025

* 5 6 Reference:- FO 371 / 61889

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Cypher/OTP

TORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).
D. ? 25rd November, 19 23rd November, 1947.

No. 3507. 23rd November, 1947. R. 8.42 p.m. 23rd November, 1947. Repeated to Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

GIANT.

Palestine.

My telegram No. 3498. El 1/24 NOV

The text of proposed revisions which was before Sub-Committee One as a working paper on the 21st. November emitted the following sentences of the previously adopted text, presumably since, although forming part of revised sections, no revision of these particular sentences was proposed.

- (a) The sentence in Section A 2 regarding evacuation from a seaport, as given in my telegram No. 3447.
- The last two sentences of Section B 12, as in my telegram No. 3423. The additional report of Sub-Committee One submitted yesterday to the Ad Hoe Committee recommended adoption of a revised text to which these sentences had been restored.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 223.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office, for repetition to Jerusalem].

0:0

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION 1025

FROM JEDDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE NOV

Mr. Trott,

D. 11.00 a.m. 23rd November, 1947.

No.381 22nd November 1947.

R. 4.05 p.m. 23rd November, 1947.

6 1727 /951/31

Repeated to Arab posts and B.M.E.O.Cairo.

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No.480.

Azzam Pasha.

United States colleague who had a talk with Azzam when he passed through here on his way to Riyadh on November 18th tells me that Azzam spoke as follows:

- 1) He hoped that the Americans realised that the Arabs were in earnest.
- 2). He knew that the financial resources of the Arabs could never hope to equal those of the Jews which he estimated at \$ 170,000,000.
- 3). Nor did he under-estimate the strength of the Jews now in Palestine.
- 4). He was however sure that the Arabs, even if repulsed at first, would be bound to win in the end.
- 5). He was going to Riyadh to persuade the King to promise a force of 5,000 men and a contribution of \$2,000,000.
- 2. I hear that Azzam who reached Riyadh on November 19th proposes to spend some days in Jedda on his return and if so I hope to have a talk with him.

Foreign Office please pass Amman and Cairo to B.M.E.O. as my telegrams Nos. 55 and 44 respectively.

[Repeated to Amman].

d Want

QQQ

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

CYPHER/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION 1.11026

FROM JEDDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Trott. No. 383.

D: 6.00 p.m.23rd Wavenill 1917

23rd November, 1947.

R: 9.21 p.m.23rd November, 1947.

Repeated to: Damascus,

Beirut, Amman, Bagdad, Cairo,

B.M.E.O.Cairo.

RESTRICTED

Your telegram No. 480 and my telegram No. 381 Azzam Pasha.

I leave for Riyadh November 24th to present my letters and hope to see Azzam Pasha there.

Foreign Office please pass to Amman and Cairo to Beirut as my telegrams Nos. 57 and 45 respectively.

[Repeated to Amman]

QQQ



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1947	PALESTINE	24 NOV
Registry E11027/951/31. Number TELEGRAM FROM. M. Lewdas No. Damas cels Dated S 20 Received in Registry 22 Now 24 -	Refer #0 til 583 h Dama fram recent conversations aict U.S. collegue, and woon, Lelieues that chere embry one from mare the Luyrented by from but was particular of	auch boding Lymans, auch Fixour KHAN exists at yast in now "higher command" not recordantly all
Last Paper. (10771) 11026	Pp. in action:	spries attached
(Action completed.) (Action completed.) Next Paper.	Pf. sudmit i when received.	BAGVS 26.11
(11230)	30471 F.O.P	

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Cypher/OTP CABLET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM DATASCUS TO FOREIGH FFICE.

D. 5.22 p.m. 22nd November, 1.47.

22nd November, 1.47.

22nd November, 1.47.

Repeated to Bagdad, Beirut, Jedda, Cairo (British Middle East Office), United lingdom Delegation New York.

SHORET.

583 to Danwons

Your telegram Mo. [583 to Bagdad J Arres

From recent conversations with leading Syrians, with my United States colleague and with Firoz Than Noon, I believe that there exists at least in embryonic form more than one "higher command" supported by some but not necessarily all the Arab States.

- The first to which Azzam referred in his conversations with me reported in my telegram No. 511 is for controlling the movements of Arab regular armed forces. One of its principal objects is to prevent any claim jumping by Transjordan forces, action which would be undoubtedly most unpopular in Syrian Government circles and as seen from here also with Ming Parcuk and The Caude Tt caude from here also with King Farouk and Ibn Saud. It seems quite possible that this "command" has not been discussed with ing Abdullah (see Amman telegram No. 346 to you).
- The second "higher command" is engaged in organising irregulars and may well be split into two or more opposing groups. In Syria there are such persons as Mebih Azmeh, Adel Az.... Fawzi, Kawakji, and Izzat Darawazzeh who are more or less openly arming and organising volunteers. I believe they have recently been joined by a Palestinian, Mouimen Maadi, and by a Saudi anabian Officer whose name I do not know A Saudi Mabian Officer whose name I do not know. A personal representative of Ming Farouk recently visited Damascus and made contact with these individuals. This group does not see eye to eye with the ex Mufti and would be, in my opinion, at present unlikely to co-operate with him if he insists on heading irregulars or any "provisional galestinian Government".

Foreign Office please pass to United Hingdom Delegation Hew York as my telegram Ho. 11 Cairo pass to British Hiddle Hast Office as my telegram Ho. 85.

[Repeated to United Mingdom Delegation, Bew York].

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En clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3509

D. 9.57 p.m. November 23rd, 1947.

November 23rd, 1947.

R. 6.10 a.m. November 24th, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem and Saving to Washington

GIANT

111030

My telegram No. 3490.

Palestine.

24 NOV

At morning meeting of Ad hoc Committee on November 22nd, Chairman of Sub-committee one (Pruszynski) submitted additional report containing amendments given in my telegram No. 3498 with addition of sentences referred to in my telegram No. 3507. He stated that Sub-committee one understood that Sir A. Cadogan's statement of November 20th represented His Majesty's Government's final statement on their report.

- November 19th by Pakistan. Lebanon, Netherlands and Iraq (see my telegram No. 3472) emphasising that he had not been able to consult all the members of his Sub-committee as to his replies, and that they therefore represented his personal views for which he alone was responsible.
- In answer to the first two questions of the delegate of Pakistan (paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 3490) he stated that the General Assembly had been asked for recommendations regarding the future Gevernment of Palestine by the Mandatory Power. Latter was prepared to hand over authority to a United Nations Commission. The plan of Sub-committee one did not envisage the Commission as directly governing Palestine, but only as an agency for the transfer of authority to the Provisional Councils. The function of the Commission would be to guide the Councils in their task of giving effect to the Assembly's recommendations. He then queted relevant articles from the Charter showing that the Assembly had the right to discuss any matter within the scope of the Charter, and to draw the attention of the Security Council to a situation likely to disturb peace. The British Government had accepted the position that the Assembly can make recommendations regarding the future Government of Palestine. The basic issue in the question was that the people of Palestine were non-self-governing, and therefore their future was the concern of the United Nations. Articles 12 and 77-79 applied to Palestine. Article 34 authorised the Security Council to intervene in Palestine if a situation arose endangering peace there.
- fourth question put by Pakistan (paragraph 4 (4) of my telegram No. 3472) he stated that Sub-committee one had not telegram No. 3472) he stated that sub-committee one had not considered these issues but that, with reference to the validity of the mandate, he accepted the views of U.N.S.C.O.P. validity of the mandate, he accepted the views of U.N.S.C.O.P. It was fantastic to declare that the mandate was invalid. It had been conferred by the League of Nations and the obligations and responsibilities of the League invales of mandates were now vested in the United Nations.

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put to him by Pakistan, he declared that the establishment of a Jewish State provided the main solution of this problem, which had, moreover, been dealt with in Committee III. Regarding the question of the viability of the proposed two States he considered U.N.S.C.O.P. sopinion just and acceptable. In answer to the question regarding boundary modifications (paragraph 4 (1) of my telegram No. 5472) he admitted that great difficulties existed, but stated that the intention had all along been to reduce the minorities left in each State. He then quoted population figures for the two States as contained in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 5439. The Sub-committee had not concerned itself with the Bedouin population, since Bedouin were only nomads. In any case Europe too had a large population of nomads who had to be considered.

he stated that in most cases these had been respected. There were 37 villages which under the U.N.S.C.O.P. plan had been cut off from their lands, and this number had only been increased to 54 by Sub-committee one. A total of 450 villages still remained which had not been cut off from their lands. There were many topographical and technical reasons (e.g. case of a reservoir) which made separation inevitable.

Netherlands (paragraph 6 of my telegram No. 3472) he said that he hoped that the Arabs would give proof of political and moral maturity, and agree to establish their own State. If the United Nations Commission was unable by 1st April 1948 to set up the Arab State, owing to Arab recalcitrance, the matter would have to be referred to the Security Council. It was not contemplated that Jewish militia would be used in the Arab areas. Word militia could be defined as "Home Guard".

(paragraph 5 (4) of my telegram No. 3472) he declared that the Security Council must act in conformity with the instructions of the General Assembly. There was no risk therefore of confusion.

that the General Assembly had no powers under the Charter beyond discussion and recommendation. Article 14 was all very well, but the Assembly was not recommending a peaceful adjustment of a situation. Sub-committee one had chosen an estrich like attitude in refusing to face up to the necessity for using force to implement its plan, in view of the attitude of the Arabs towards partition. If the United Nations really believed that the solution proposed was in accordance with the Charter then it should provide its own force to implement such a solution. The Security Council had no forces at present and the Committee should be informed of what the Council intended to do in the matter.

of the report of Sub-committee one and said that the Mandatory Power was in fact being asked to facilitate immigration. This was surely inconsistent with the statement made by the United Kingdom representative

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regarding the maintenance of the present system of control in respect of immigration until the termination of the mandate.

The delegate of Pakistan took up the same point and asked whether if the mandate was terminated say on the 31st March, 1948, it would be possible for the mandatory power to evacuate a seaport in anticipation of the termination of the mandate, or would the mandatory withdraw its forces after the termination of the mandate. As regards B2 of the report of Sub-committee One, he enquired whether the progressive handing over of the administration by the mandatory would take effect before or after the termination of the mandate. If the former were the case then it would not be in conformity with the statements of the United Kingdom representative. As regards B2 (2) of the report, if the United Nations Commission was to have the force of law it must have legislative power and would therefore not merely be an agency as stated by the Chairman of Sub-committee One. Turning to B12 he asked who would remain responsible for the administration in the areas from which the mandatory's force had been withdrawn. The last two sentences of Bl2 appeared to him to be inconsistent with the statements of the United Kingdom representative since they implied implementation on the part of the mandatory. He also enquired whether Bl3 referred to the transitional period or to the period after the termination of the mandate.

ll.[sie] Syrian delegate stressed injustice of partition plan, which was contrary to the mandate and to the principles of the Charter. Under partition the Arabs would be deprived of their rights and position. The people of the Middle East and of Asia utterly rejected partition. He earnestly appealed to the conscience of all who represented peace-loving nations to consider very carefully the position when it came to voting, and warned of the gloomy outlook for the future if partition were adopted.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 225.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

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En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No.3510 23rd November, 1947. D. 10.40 p.m. 23rd November, 1947.

R. 7.50 a.m. 24th November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem, Washington Saving.

My telegram No.3509.

[11031

Palestine.

When the Ad Hoc Committee met yesterday afternoon the New Zealand representative (Berendsen) stated that his delegation still stood by the principle of partition, but that in their opinion the proposals now before the committee "ignored the problems of implementation to an extent that is deplorable". "The mandatory power" he said "cannot during the transitional period, with any degree of justice, be charged with the sole responsibility for

implementing any proposal for partition. If the United Nations assumes the responsibility of deciding upon the partition of Palestine - and we hope that it will - them the United Nations must similarly assume the responsibility for implementing that decision, and that responsibility must lie with the United Nations as a whole. There must be a means of enforcement, of policing the country, of maintaining the public services, and especially law and order, and that means of enforcement must be provided by every

member of the United Nations according to the proportionate strength of that member. It is our view that the subcommittee has failed to face this problem - that it has failed to provide effective measures for enforcement without which in our view there can be no reasonable prospect of partition, or indeed of any other solution of this grave problem of human relations." He was therefore instructed to urge that the proposal be amended to make adequate provision for implementation. Unless this was done his delegation could not vote for the whole of the partition plan. Further, his delegation considered that the Committee

had not had sufficient time to study all the details of the proposals and that it was extremely unwise to attempt to reach a decision under pressure. He suggested, therefore, that the Assembly should remain in session until such time as was necessary to enable the committee to give proper consideration to the prepesals or that the committee should

constitute itself a special session of the Assembly as soon as its work as a committee had been completed. This suggestion was later supported by the delegates of Denmark

and Colombia.

Pearson/...

09

- 2. Pearson put two questions in regard to the report of Sub-Committee 2.
- (a) Were the members of that sub-committee satisfied that a peaceful transfer of power could be brought about on the basis of their recommendations? The delegate of Pakistan replied later in the debate that this was a question which could only be answered by the peoples of Palestine.
- (b) In view of the fact that the mandatory had declared that it will terminate the mandate without making provision for any subsequent government did Sub-Committee 2 consider that an adequate juridical basis is provided in the Charter for the establishment of a unitary and sovereign state? To this Zafrullah Khan replied in the sense that the mandate had been established under an article of the covenant of the League which recognised that certain communities had reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations could be provisionally recognised subject only to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they were able to stand alone. That advice and assistance which was the only limitation placed upon the independence of Palestine was no longer necessary and was about to be withdrawn. Having been withdrawn and provisional independence recognised under the covenant became, juridically, full independence.
- 3. Shertok renewed the offer of the Jewish Agency to relinquish Beersheba and an area to the north of the town and also an area of two million dunums along the Egyptian frontier. The delegate of the United States said that his delegation would have preferred a greater adjustment in the Negeb but indicated that they were now prepared to accept the Jewish Agency's proposal and to withdraw their previous reservations in this matter. Evatt said that if an amendment to the recommendations of Sub-Committee One were put forward in written form, it would be considered; Herschel Johnson replied that the United States would be glad to put forward such an amendment. In later comment the Iraq delegate said that this offer and its acceptance had demonstrated that it was the Jewish Agency which had really determined the plan of Sub-Committee One and that the Sub-Committee had always bec under the influence of that body.
- 4. Herschel Johnson associated himself with the views expressed by the delegate of Poland in regard to the legal isques; he considered the legal objections which had been raised to be simply formal in character and that they did not seriously affect the substance of Sub-Committee's proposals. He also contested the view of the representative of New Zealand that the plan imposed sole responsibility for implementation on the mandatory power. "It was this very situation" he said, "which sub-committee One, with very desultory assistance from the mandatory power, endeavoured strenuously to avoid." The plan did however/...



however postulate a co-operation by the mandatory power, not necessarily by way of implementation, but with the machinery of the United Nations Commission. His delegation believed that if the General Assebmly should approve the plan it would have properly discharged the function of making recommendations "concerning the future government of Palestine" in accordance with the request made by the United Kingdom last spring. They also believed that no member of the United Nations would attempt to defy a decision of the Assembly. The plan was the greatest test ever presented to the integrity of the United Nations as a whole.

- 5. Here followed speech by Martin full text of which is given in my immediately following telegram.
- 6. The delegate of Iraq in the course of a speech rejecting the theory that the General Assembly had authority to implement a plan of partition quoted the command paper of 1937 in which His Majesty's Government had stated that the political administrative and financial difficulties of partition were so great that they had reached the conclusion that this solution was impracticable and invited the representative of the mandatory to say whether the conditions had so changed as to render partition more practicable today.
- 7. The delegate of Poland made a short speech entirely devoted to an attack on the United Kingdom representative on Sub-Committee One, the work of which, he said, had been rendered extremely difficult on account of that representatives attitude. It had been impossible to establish intimate cooperation with him and the impression had been given that the sub-committee was working on one side of the fence and the United Kingdom on the other.
- 8. The delegate of El Salvador stated that he would vote only for those recommendations which provided for the protection of the hely places. The delegate of Bolivia said that his country was in favour of partition but that this solution should not be taken as a precedent of refuture problems which the United Nations would face. The line taken by the delegate of China was that the report of sub-committee One did not altogether commend itself to his government but that since the problem could not be left unsettled they were inclined to accept it faut de mieux.
- exclusively to questions relating to the safeguarding of hely places and of the special religious and cultural interests of France in Palestine. He asked for the preservation of rights hitherto enjoyed under Article 8 of the mandate and in particular "of the legal status of French establishments in Palestine defined by a Franco-Turkish agreement and another British-French agreement of 1920".

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 226.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem]

ORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

[11032

24 NOV

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdon Delegation to United Mations).

No. 3512.

D. 7.42 p.m. 23rd November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

GIANT.

My telegram No. 3510.

Palestine Committee.

At the third meeting on the 22nd flovember the first spearer was the delegate for Chile who announced that he would vote for the partition proposal. He was followed by Alireza (Saudi Arabia) who said he was not prepared to discuss the partition plan. He wished however to emphasise that the committee were being asked to approve the establishment under United Dations auspices of a Jewish Army. Teferring to a remark made in Sub-Committee 1 by Granados, he said that one of "your nominated commissioners" had already stated that he would rather have 5,000 men than 5,000 children as is migrants for reasons which were obvious. Alireza also connented on Pruszynski's statement that the Bedouin had not been included in Sub-Committee's figures of population because they were nomads. Here nomads not human beings?

- 2. Pearson (Canada) said that the amended proposal for implementation placed more emphasis than the original draft had done on co-operation between United Mations and the mandatory power. The fact that they did not now on what date the handate would be terminated was a very real difficulty. But they must assume from what the United Kingdom Delegation had said that the mandate would be terminated very soon. This seemed to imply that it would terminate before the British forces were withdrawn from any area. If this were in fact the intention most of the inconsistencies in the plan for implementation would But if by some chance areas were evacuated disappear. before the andate ended, how could the sandatory maintain its responsibilities in those areas? It was true that not all the difficulties of implementation had been overcome, but "all we can do is to hope that the peoples of Palestine will co-operate". Pearson challenged Berendsen to produce an amendment on the lines of his speech. Referring to Johnson's [? omission] the United Ringdom's attitude he said that the Sub-Committee had received every possible assistance from the United Ringdom Delegation. He proceeded however to exclude the United Ringdom Government from this compliment. The plan of Sub-Committee 1 would work provided that it obtained the co-operation of the pandatory power, the active backing of the permanent members mandatory power, the active backing of the permanent members of the Security Council and acceptance by the peoples of Palestine and by all members of the United Mations. far as the mandatory power was concerned, he was confident that the Commission could count on its co-operation.
 - 3. Mincic (Yugoslavia) stated that his delegation had /not...

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
not changed its attitude and would not vote for either plan. Genzalez Fernandez (Celembia) supported the request of Denmark and New Zealand for more time to debate the issues. So important a matter as the future of Palestine should not be subordinated to plane and ship reservations. Loridan (Belgium) explained that his delegation could no longer support the proposal for referring legal problems to the International Court, because it was now too late for this to be of use. The United Kingdom delegation had justly drawn attention to the gap in the present plan and he would abstain from voting on partition at this stage. The delegation for the Dominican Republic said that partition was better than nothing, and he would vote for it.

4. Johnson (United States) confirmed Pearson's supposition that in his previous speech he had intended to criticise not the United Kingdom delegation but the United Kingdom Government, which had not been entirely helpful and had not "closed any of the gaps which existed either in fact or in imagination". He said the United States delegation would not be able to understand abstentions on so important a question. He asserted that the programme for implementation was adequate. The key to this problem was the loyal acceptance of the decisions of the United Nations. He believed that the United Kingdom would act as a good member and would co-operate on a practical basis. He concluded by urging the Committee to "grasp the nettle".

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 22.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for Repetition to Jerusalem].

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E11039

En clair

WORLD ORGANISATION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3511

D. 11.10 p.m. 23rd November, 1947.

23rd November, 1947.

R. 6.30 a.m. 24th November, 1947.

Repeated to : Jerusalem

Washington - Saving

111036

GIANT

My immediately preceding telegram.

24 NOV

Following is full text of speech made yesterday by United Kingdom representative at Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question.

[Begins]

I should like to deal first with the questions raised by the representative of Pakistan. In so doing perhaps the Chair will permit me to make one or two more general comments. It is difficult for the Government of the United Kingdom to make every detail of its future timetable in Palestine absolutely clear. It is difficult to see how the situation will develop exactly. It is the practice of the British people, in dealing with political questions, to employ empirical methods. We have difficulty in binding ourselves as to the action we shall take in every conceivable situation. But on the main principles we are absolutely clear in our own minds and I hope it is possible to make our intentions and our feelings absolutely clear to this Committee.

On the main question of implementation and the part which my Government would play in it, we have made no fewer than five statements which I think have all agreed absolutely with one another; there has been no deviation. Sir Alexander Cadegan, speaking to this Committee the other day, said that his Government had assumed that the Assembly, in drawing up its proposals, would take full account of the risk of strife in Palestine and of the need to provide means of filling the gap in the absence of enforcement left by the decision of the Mandatory Power to the effect that its troops could not be used as the instrument of the United Nations for this purpose.

With all deference to the representative of the United States I must say that we feel that there is a gap in the plan now put forward. It is only right in our view that the representatives making a decision on this plan should recognise that gap. The proposal states that organisations shall come into being following upon the withdrawal of the Mandatory Power. But if faced with opposition - the character of which can be estimated according to the nature of the plan - it emits to provide for any force to compel

acceptance

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acceptance of the plan. Clearly a risk is being taken. It is for the delegations to see that they are taking that risk. It is not for my delegation to say that they should not take it but, with our knowledge of the situation as it is, of the feekings amongst the peoples of Palestine and of the probable reactions, we shall be failing in our duty if we did not point out that the risk exists.

I hope that we have made our attitude very clear on that point. Secondly I should like to have our attitude made clear also on a subordinate point - our attitude toward specific proposals, and particularly those of Sub-Committee I. The questions which I am now answering relate to those proposals.

So long as the Mandate continues to exist my Government insists on undivided control throughout the country. If a scheme of partition is approved and a Commission is set up as proposed in the plan, the Palestine Government would hand over its authority - in the words of Sir Alexander Cadegan which were used the other day - "when the time came to hand over its authority". Sir Alexander Cadegan was asked subsequently what he meant by when the time came", and he said it meant "when and as we evacuate territory". I think that gives the main answer to the questions of the representative of Pakistan. In other words the authority of the Mandatory Power continues unimpaired until the Mandate is terminated and then it is reduced stage by stage applying only to a limited extent in these areas under military occupation. Progressive transfer, in the sense in which it is used in these Articles, would in sur view begin after termination of the Mandate.

Therefore my delegation agrees with the suggestion of the representative of Pakistan and, if paragraph B12 of the additional report of Sub-Committee I was to be brought into full accord with the position as my Government understands it, there would have to be an object of the words "in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces". I think the Chairman made the nature of this document clear. As we understand it this is the plan put forward by the Sub-Committee. It is not of course at this stage the plan of the Mandatory Government, but the Sub-Committee was good enough to consider their plan further in the light of our statements, and as I understand it, modified the plan with the intention of bringing it into accord with the attitude there described.

I was serry that the representative of the United States referred to the "desiliery assistance" of the Mandatory Power in the discussions in the Sub-Committee. It was certainly our wish to be as helpful as we could in the Sub-Committee. We put ourselves at their disposal. We answered their questions, and where we were in doubt, we referred to our Government in London. But at the moment we are thinking particularly of the implementation, and I am bound to say in defence of our position - if any defence is needed - that we were not in fact invited to be members of the Working Group: which originally worked out this proposal. I do not say it was appropriate we should be, but I do not myself think we deserve any rebuke for the nature of our participation in the work of the Sub-Committee.

From our understanding of the nature of this document, follow the replies - I do not know that I need give them in detail - to some of the points raised by the representative of Pakistan and also I think by one or two other representatives. For instance there is the point at the end of Section A, paragraph 2, about the evacuation of a seaport and hinterland. That is a proposal in the plan of the Sub-Committee. I am asked to comment on that. I must say that at the moment the full plan of withdrawal, the time-table, the programme with dates, areas and so on is not yet worked out. And therefore I can only say that my Government takes note, if this is adopted by the Committee, of this proposal.

Turning to the last two sentences of Section B, paragraph 12, of the document under discussion, I owe the Bub-Committee an apology, because the comment I am making now I did not make at the Sub-Committee's meeting yesterday. In the paper circulated there, this paragraph ended with the words "withdrawn its armed forces", and I did not realise that the last two sentences, which had been included in the original draft, were intended to be retained. first sentence reads: "The Commission shall assist the Mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions". would remind the Committee that as we made clear we must insist on undivided control of any area for which we continue to hold responsibility, that is the whole of Palestine, until the termination of the Mandate and that is a responsibility we cannot share, so that as far as these words could be taken as meaning that in any way the Commission would share in the administration of the government or of the responsibility for the administration, we must reserve our position.

The last sentence of this paragraph reads: "Similarly, the Mandatory shall co-operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions". I need hardly say that if the United Nations should decide to appoint a Commission and give it this task in Palestine, the Mandatory Government would be bound to assist it, but the form which that assistance could take would always have to be subject to the overriding responsibility for law and order. The Commission could not under cover of the protection of the forces of the Mandatory Power, perform functions which in any way impaired law and order.

The representative of Pakistan referred to paragraph 13 of Section B regarding "progressive transfer". I think that the existence of a comma in the last line but one after "law and order" makes it clear that this transfer only takes place under this plan in the areas from which the forces of the Mandatory Power have been withdrawn. These are in our understanding the only areas where such a transfer could take place.

That

That is all I have to say on these questions. There may be more at a later stage, but I would just add - because I feel that the last statement which was made did reflect in some way criticism of the position and attitude of the United Kingdom Government, which may be shared by other delegations - that I feel sure that all delegations in the discussions here have seen the nature of the task and the difficulties. Which country has helped us in this task? Has any hindered us? If there is fighting in Palestine the soldiers who will be there under these proposals will be British. There will be no others. If lives are lost, they will be the lives of British soldiers. If there are widows and orphans, they will be in Britain and not in any of the other countries represented here.

[Ends]

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 227.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office, for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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Reference:- FO 371 61889

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Cypher/OTP

PRISEC

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3460
D. 5.25 p.m. 19th November, 1947
R. 11.02 p.m. 19th November, 1947

Repeated to Washington Saving

IMPORTANT

Following for Secretary of State and Colonial Secretary from Minister of State.


I have been considering with Cadogan the prospects of the discussion on Palestine extending beyond 25th November which, as you know, is now the date provisionally fixed for the end of the Assembly.

- 2. It now looks as if, in spite of the feverish efforts of Dr. Evatt, this may well be the case, though if by any chance the Committee should approve the plan of the Sub-Committee before the end of the week a plenary could of course ratify this decision on Monday or Tuesday. But if there is no two-thirds majority in sight, we must envisage the possibility that the Assembly, rather than confess failure, will instruct the Sub-Committee to think again and prepare some other plan and in this event proceedings may drag on for a considerable period.
- 3. If things turn out in this way, I myself believe that the best plan would be to keep the present session of the Assembly in being but for all delegates to leave save the President and those who are taking part in the ad hoc committee on Palestine. This would mean that at any time the Palestine Committee could turn itself into a plenary and formally report.
- 4. If you should agree, I would propose to talk to the President on these lines if and when delay appears to be inevitable. So far as we are concerned of course, I imagine that Cadogan, Martin and Beeley could perfectly well carry on and that there would be no need whatever for other members of the delegation to postpone their departure.
- 5. If this is agreed, Martin will communicate with the Colonial Office about MacGillivray.

[Copy sent to Colonial Secretary]

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November 1947.

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Your telegram No. 3460 [of November 19th: Palestine].

Following for Minister of State from the Foreign Secretary and Colonial Secretary.

We assume that further discussions in sub-committees as a result of Cadogan's statement will have made still less probable the conclusion of Assembly discussions on Palestine before November 25th. We agree with you that, if the Assembly are unwilling to confess failure, it would be better for the session to be kept in being with a definite device in reached, than for it to be terminated and a new special session take place when Palestine Committee was ready. We hope, however, that proceedings would not in any case drag on for an unlimited time. Unless really strenuous efforts are made to conciliate the two points of view, of which there has at present been very little sign at United Nations, it seems likely that continuance of discussions there would remove any slight chance there may be of compromise settlement out of court in the course of our withdrawal.

2. You and Cadogan will no doubt make it absolutely clear at the appropriate time

that/

Wt. 43697-140 100m 3/47 G.S.St.

that, even if Assembly fail to reach any decision, we shall continue our evacuation programme, and plan for its completion by fulling agreement between the two parties)
August 1st. 1 (The United States Ambassador was informed to this effect on November 21st in reply to an enquiry as to our intentions).

- 3. We agree to staff arrangements suggested in your paragraph 4.
- 4. As soon as you can better estimate the course of developments, it would be most useful to us to know what is the latest moment at which Cadogan could effectively intervene again, if this was thought desirable, on the basis of further information about our plans for ending civil administration and phasing of withdrawal, on which we are working here, but which are most difficult to complete.

OUT

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

SECRET
Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 4052
23rd November, 1947
D. 5.40 p.m. 23rd November, 1947

Repeated to Washington No. 12096

IMMEDIATE SECRET

Your telegram No. 3460 [of 19th November: Palestine].


We assume that further discussions in sub-committees as a result of Cadogan's statement will have made still less probable the conclusion of Assembly discussions on Palestine before 25th November. We agree with you that, if the Assembly are unwilling to confess failure, it would be better for the session to be kept in being until a definite decision is reached, than for it to be terminated and a new special session take place when Palestine Committee was ready. We hope, however, that proceedings would not in any case drag on for an unlimited time. Unless really strenuous efforts are made to conciliate the two points of view, of which there has at present been very little sign at United Nations, it seems likely that continuance of discussions there would remove any slight chance there may be of compromise settlement out of court in the course of our withdrawal.

- 2. You and Cadogan will no doubt make it absolutely clear at the appropriate time that, even if Assembly fail to reach any decision, we shall continue our evacuation programme, and plan for its completion by 1st August failing agreement between the two parties. (The United States Ambassador was informed to this effect on 21st November in reply to an enquiry as to our intentions).
- 3. We agree to staff arrangements suggested in your paragraph 4.
- 4. As soon as you can better estimate the course of developments, it would be most useful to us to know what is the latest moment at which Cadegan could effectively intervene again, if this was thought desirable, on the basis of further information about our plans for ending civil administration and phasing of withdrawal, on which we are working here, but which are most difficult to complete.

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WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 4061

D. 12.20 p.m. 24th November 1947

24th November 1947

Repeated to Washington No. 12106 Jerusalem


MOST IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL GLANT

Following for Cadogan from Sargent.

Palestine.

We assume that when there is voting on plans for Palestine in ad hoc Committee you will abstain. We hope to send you very shortly a further telegram on the question of voting in the plenary session of the Assembly. What is the earliest date on which a vote is likely to be taken in the plenary?

CCC



30471 F.O.P

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WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 3517.

D. 12.42 p.m. 24th November 1947.

24th November 1947. R. 5.56 p.m. 24th November 1947.

Repeated to: Jerusalem and Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

GIANT.

SECRET.

Your telegram No.4061.

Following for Sargent from Cadogan.

Palestine.

United States Delegation are now undoubtedly putting pressure on other Delegations to support partition and are trying to rush matters to a final vote with as little discussion as possible. If these tactics succeed, final vote in Plenary Session may take place on Wednesday.


2. We are proposing to re-state our position in Plenary. We await your instructions on use of our vote there, but we hope that you appreciate that, after our strictly neutral attitude hitherte, it would be extremely difficult for us to do anything other than abstain.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Palestine as my telegram No. 230.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office, for re-transmission to Palestine.]

M:A:A:A:A





CUTTLE

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK
(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

D.11.45 a.m. 25th November, 1947 No. 4077 25th November, 1947

Repeated to Washington No.12142 Most Immediate

MOST IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL GIANT

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation New York telegram No. 4077 of 25th November, 1947 repeated for information to Washington and Jerusalem.

[Your telegram No. 3517 [of November 24th: Palestine].

I agree. You should abstain from voting in plenary session.

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Most minediale Draft. TOPSECRET. Palestine. Foll from Eastern Alft horier of sometime UK del meeting of Ministers &- moura News/for morning please les us Date Novab to have by most immediate tel. addressed & Resident clark on seaching available here not later than 7 a.m. our time report on Assembly if it has taken place or if not on present southon

Cypher/OTP

OUT FILE

FILES

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 4101

D. 4.07 p.m. 26th November, 1947

26th November, 1947

MOST IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

Palestine.

Following from Eastern Department.

In view of possible meeting of Ministers tomorrow morning please let us have by most immediate telegram addressed to Resident Clerk and available here not later than 7 a.m. our time report on Assembly voting if it has taken place, or if not on present position and probable time of voting.

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PALESTINE 25 101

Polarline bammistron

Where is your a more apost on which leaves too consulted privately to respected commission of fine small states a communican which would consist of US USSR and one neutral an include a present proceedings with this proposal. I report this proposal that was sent last might. Please attach a resultant of Mr. 28

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Next Paper.

30471 F.O.P

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

1:047

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 3518.

D. 12.12 p.m. 24th November 1947.

24th November 1947. R. 5.27 p.m. 24th November 1947.

Repeated to: Jerusalem and Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

GIANT.

LIGHT.

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 3518 of 24th November repeated Jerusalem and Washington.

Palestine.

There is now a move, on which Pearson has consulted us privately, to substitute for proposed commission of five small States a commission which would consist of United States U.S.S.R. and one neutral.

- 2. A commission of this character would have advantage of involving the United States directly in Palestine. Seviet Union would obtain direct representation, but it must be remembered that at least one and probably more of original five would be Soviet stooges. A further advantage of commission of three is that it would be less subservient to Jewish Agency.
- 3. On other hand we think that, if character of commission were changed in this way, whole partition plan would have a greater chance of obtaining a twothirds majority.
- 4. We do not know attitude of United States delegation to new proposal. If they should turn it down, they may thereby incur substantial responsibility for failure of Assembly to reach a decision.
- 5. On balance, and subject to your conclusions from paragraph 3 above, we think it preferable not to advise Pearson against proceeding with this proposal. He will no doubt ask for our views today, and it is even possible that amendment may be introduced in ad hoc Committee today. We should therefore welcome your most urgent instructions.

Please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram

No.231. [Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for retransmission to Jerusalem.]

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SECRET FILE Registry No. Most Immediate F.O., Add UKDU Now for No rep for if to Wash " & Tornsvlen four til . NO 3518 [JNon 24: Paleotine J. Any firm involving the participation of the forit Union in a commission operating in Palestine is most undesirable even admitting that there would in my case frobably to a Russian Hooge World ong. 2. It would be better for this proposal to be opposed by the VS A or some other delegation Han by ourselves. It was you are satisfied that it will be effectively opposed, particularly by the US del", you can bear could

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but if you have any doubts on this a there is any chance of the proposal going through you should inform Pearson of the views set out above; a we should have thought it advisable to take him into our confidence in any case.

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WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM FORLIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 4073

D. 8.45 p.m. 24th November 1947

24th November 1947

Repeated to Washington No. 12132 Jerusalem

MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET GIANT

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation New York No. 4073 November 24th repeated for information to Washington and Jerusalem.

Your telegram No. 3518 [of November 24th: Palestine].

Any plan involving the participation of the Soviet Union in a Commission operating in Palestine is most undesirable, even admitting that there would in any case probably be a Russian stooge.

2. It would be better for this proposal to be opposed by the United States or some other delegation than by ourselves. If you are satisfied that it will be effectively epposed, particularly by the United States Delegation, you could let matters take their course. But if you have any doubts on this and there is any chance of the proposal going through you should inform Pearson of the views set out above; and we should have thought it advisable to take him into our confidence in any case.

CCG

U.N. ASSEMBLY APPEALS FOR UNIC CO-OPERITION

FLUSHING MEADOW -- The U.N. General Assembly unanimously resolved in November 20 to call on all nations to co-operate with the United Nations Appeal for Children. Assembly President Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil during discussion of the resolution told the delegates that contributions "have been pitifully small" and pleaded for greater co-operation.

Mr. James Thorn of New Zealand called attention to the fact that the United States has offered 40,000,000 dollars to match contributions by other nations. Only Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, France, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark and the United States have contributed. A total of 30,000,000 dollars has been contributed by those nations, and Mr. Charles Malik, of Lebanon, reported that in the first eight weeks of operations, the Fund shipped from the United States and Canada more than 10,000 tons of supplies to Europe.

The fund recently reported it has received 5,650,000 dollars from UNRRA, 15,000,000 dollars from the United States and about 10,000,000 dollars from other governments.

PALESTINE SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE BY THE UNITED NATIONS, MR. ARMOUR SAYS

NEW YORK -- The U.S. Government's studied opinion is that settlement of the Palestine question should be on an international plane, by the United Nations acting in accordance with the principles and procedures of the U.N. Charter, Assistant Secretary of State Norman Armour stated here on November 20.

Speaking before the Arab-American Institute, gathered to honour members of the Arab countries' delegations to the current U.N. Assembly, Mr. Armour said that Arab-American friendship is "a fundamental objective of the American Government."

Mr. Armour pointed out that the Palestine issue is now before the "bar of world opinion democratically personified in the membership of U.N. Assembly." And that because of this it would be improper for him to review the issues involved in the Palestine problem.

"I can, however," he added, "tell you what the American Government's studied opinion is. It is that the problem is international, in law and in fact, and that settlement of it must be found on an international plane, by the United Nations, in accordance with principles and procedures of the San Francisco Charter. The American Government believes that a just and workable settlement can be found by that organisation."

Mr. Armour noted the Institute's apposition to partition of Palestine. Concerning the partition issue, he stated:

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"The majority of the 11 members of the U.N. Special Committee which reviewed the entire problem last summer took the position that the United Nations could find, within the framework of the concept of partition, a just and workable sttlement. To the careful studies and report of the committee, the United States, in Secretary Marshall's words, lends 'great weight.' Consequently, during current debates at Take Success, we have been endeavouring to contribute to the elaboration of the details of a just and workable plan of partition."

No matter what the final decision of the General Assembly will be, Mr. Armour said, "we confidently believe the United Nations may continue to count on the sincere good counsel and helpful co-operation of all its members.

"Those in Washington who have to do with formulation of American foreign policy would count it a tragic, even disastrous loss were the foundations of Arab-American friendship to be affected as a result of divergency of views thus far advanced on this immensely moving problem of future of our common Holy Land."

Finally, Mr. Armour stated: "No country more than the United States has welcomed the Arab states to full and equal membership in the family of nations. We stand now as in the past ready to co-operate with those states in realising the great projects so ably conceived by the leaders of their renaissance. Joint co-operation will result in mutual understanding. Therein our common goal will be attained."

BRITISH STATEMENT ON PALESTIME TO UNITED NATIONS

LAKE SUCCESS -- British Delegate Sir Alexander Cadogan on November 20 told the U.N. Assembly's Palestine Committee that Britain will be unable to play the full role assigned to her in the exact terms of either the plan for partition of Palestine or the alternate plan for a single independent Arab state of Palestine.

Sir Alexander said Britain will carry out its early withdrawal from Palestine without assuming any responsibility for establishment of a new regime, or regimes. He said his Government insists upon full control so long as it holds the Palestine mandate. He indicated that the mandate might be relinquished early in the course of British troop withdrawal or even before the withdrawal began.

The British spokesman rejected the proposal of the partition subcommittee for progressive surrender of British authority in Palestine directly to provisional councils which would be established under the partition plan.

Following the British statement, the Palestine Committee adjourned to permit further study of their reports by the two sub-committees. Procedure will be for the full Palestine committee to consider the reports of both sub-committees and then send a resolution on to the General Assembly for action at a plenary session where a two-thirds majority approval would be required for any plan.

The partition sub-committee's report was based on the plan worked out by a working group composed of the Soviet Union, the United States, Guatemala and Canada.

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3520

D. 2.02 p.m. November 24th, 1947.

November 24th, 1947.

R. 7.30 p.m. November 24th, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem and Washington

IMMEDIATE GIANT

Despite American pressure, a two-thirds majority for partition is by no means certain. If it is not obtained, we shall be vigorously blamed in American press as primarily responsible for the failure.

2. We do not yet know what the Assembly will do after vote, if a two-thirds majority is not obtained. One proposal which is being canvassed by Pearson is that they should then endeavour to form a commission of conciliation which would be sent to Palestine with a mandate to bring about, if possible, an agreement between Arabs and Jews. We would welcome your views on this suggestion, and on what we should say privately and publicly if it comes to the surface.

Jo In the same circumstances many delegations will also be concerned over fate of Jerusalem. Resolutions might be moved attempting to provide for a settlement of this problem in isolation. Has any consideration been given to possible extent of our co-operation with United Nations in safeguarding Jerusalem irrespective of situations in the rest of Palestine? We think here that probably our political credit would be at stake primarily on this point.

Please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 233.

[Gopy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem]

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OUT FILE

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World Organisation

resist the appointment of a Commission for conciliation, though its chances of success seem very small. We should, however, have to be very careful about its terms of reference and compensation to make sure that itdid not interfere with Palestine Government's authority and that its arrival in Palestine did not provoke extra disturbances. We should insist on having a say on both these points. We should almost certainly want to have time to obtain the views of the High Commissioner an any suggested terms of reference.

2. We should also not oppose suggestions for a Special Regime for Jerusalem, though here again the nature of the arrangement would require careful consideration. (There seem at first sight to be disadvantages in using the Trusteeship Council for this purpose.) Cooperation by us with any special U.N. Organisation would be strictly limited to facilitating its arrival and handing over to it in as orderly a manner as possible. We could not, however, place British Forces or Administration at its disposal or retain them in Je usalem longer

than they would otherwise stay there in the course/

course of a)planned withdrawall You will have seen from the High Commissioners! telegram No. 2251 repeated to you as No. 1628 that it might be possible to obtain recruits for a volunteer force from British police in Palestine. At first sight it seems that this would not be objectionable, provided it was absolutely dlear that they were acting as individuals and that British Authorities were not involved; but you should not encourage Delegations to think that recruits

Approved of S. of so Colonial Lee. J 26.11

would be available from this source.

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WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 4109

D. 8.55 p.m. 26th November, 1947.

26th November, 1947.

Repeated to: Jerusalem - via Colonial Office Washington No. 12221

MOST IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

GIANT

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation, New York, No. 4109 Nevember 26th: repeated for information to Jerusalem and Washington.

Your telegram No. 3520 [of November 24th - Palestine].

It would clearly be undesirable for us to resist the appointment of a Commission for conciliation, though its chances of success seem very small. We should, however, gave to be very careful about its terms of reference and composition to make sure that it did not interfere with Palestine Gevernment's authority and that its arrival in Palestine did net preveke extra disturbances. We should insist en having a say on both these points. We should almost certainly want to have time to obtain the views of the High Commissioner en any suggested terms of reference.

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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TO PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

FROM S. OF S., COLONTES.

Sent 25th November, 1947. 13.30 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

Mo. 2980 Top Secret.

by telegram No. 2977 repeating to you New York telegram to Foreign Office No. 3520. // 6///

As Assembly discussions may conclude on 26th November grateful for your most immediate common to on proposals for mission of conciliation and separate action on Jarusalem.

Distributed to:-

R.245
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Mr. Rees-Williams
Sir S. Caine
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding

Foreign Office

Mr. Mertin Mr. Trafford Smith Mr. Gutch Mr. Mathleson Mr. Higham Mr. Galeworthy Mr. Holmer Mr. Gibson Mr. Dale

Mr. B. A.B. Burrows.

Mr. Beith.

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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75872/154/22/47

Cypher (O.T.P.)

TO PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

FROM S. OF S. COLONIES.

Sent 25th November, 1947. 13,30 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2980 Top Secret.

My telegram No. 2977 repeating to you New York telegram to Foreign Office No. 3520.

As Assembly discussions may conclude on 26th November grateful for your most immediate common to on proposals for mission of conciliation and separate action on Jerusalem.

Distributed to:-

R. 243 Secretary of State Sir T. Lloyd Mr. Roos-Williams Sir S. Caine Sir C. Jeffries Mr. Holding

Foreign Office

Mr. Martin Mr. Trafford Smith Mr. Gutch Mr. Mathieson Mr. Higham Mr. Galsworthy Mr. Holmer Mr. Gibson Mr. Dale Mr. B.A.B. Burrows.

Mr. Beith.

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Cypher/OTP

25 NOV

FILES

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3521

D. 2.15 p.m. 24th November, 1947

24th November, 1947.

R. 7.30 p.m. 24th November, 1947

SECRET

Following private and personal for Lloyd. Colonial Office, from Martin. Not (repeat not) for repetition to Jerusalem.

We are puzzled by some of High Commissioner's ideas on evacuation plans as indicated in his recent telegrams (e.g. his telegram No. 2239) and assume that they are not in all respects in accordance with plans now being elaborated in London. In particular so late a date as May for termination of Mandate seems quite unacceptable if plan of Sub-Committee I is adopted. Difficulties with Jews will be greatly increased if there is to be such delay in releasing any area to their unfettered control particularly in view of proposed very early evacuation of Arab Gaza. Problems of illegal immigration and terrorism would remain with us probably in aggravated form.

[Copies sent to the Colonial Office.]

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MIL

INWARD TELEGRAM

1947

FROM MALESTINE (General Sir A. Cumningham)

TO A OF S. COLONIES.

U.19th November, 1947. R.19th " 82,50 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2210 Top Secret and Personal.

Addressed 8. of 8. for Trustord Smith.
Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation
(5. of 8. please pass as my No. 1600).

Reference Trafford Smith's telephone message today referring to your telegrom No. 2187.

- Commander-in-Chief Middle Hast Land Forces telegram was amended and passed by me in draft and represents our broad view.
- Government in all areas going as long as possible and we hope to do so if we can until time comes to close down altogether in Jerusalem, i.e., we will not leave any area even if the Army here left it unless we are forced. For instance it seems most unlikely that we would have any difficulty in following this policy in the first area to be evacuated namely Gaza district, and there are other areas in which even now there are no military forces.
- Central Covernment and keep it going for a few weeks after Army had left Jerusalem, but I see it may be necessary to give a fixed date for termination of mandate and it has been always our view that this date should coincide with termination of the Civil Covernment here. Under these conditions I consider date should be the left hay.

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4. I have cone further into the question of the effect on the Army if civil administration disappears sometime in advance of evacuation of troops. The military authorities view such a contingency with considerable apprehension, and think that in this event it is probable even less stores could be evacuated by 1st August than contemplated at the present.

5. In any case, it is essential that the railway as at present staffed should remain under Army control until withdrawal is complete, and that suitable arrangements can be made for continuance of supply of power and water in certain areas. It seems probable that the Army in these circumstances would leave Jerusalem at the same time as civil administration closes down.

6. This telegram is written on the premise that either there would be no U.N.O. Commission in the country or that it did not arrive before 1st May.

(Copies sent to Cypher Room Foreign Office for repetition to New York) Distributed to:-/



INWARD TELEGRAM

Distributed to:

R. 245 Secretary of State Sir T. Lloyd Mr. Rees-Williams Sir S. Caips Sir C. Jeffries

Cabinet Offices

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Treasury

Admiralty

War Office

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Malaba

Mr. Holding Mr. Martin Mr. Trafford Smith Mr. Gutch Mr. Mathicson Mr. Higham Mr. Galsworthy Mr. Holmer Mr. Gibson Mr. S.E.V. Inke. Brigadior Cornwall-Jones. Commander Evershed. Mr. A.J. Newling. Mr. D.F.C. Blunt. Mr. W. Russell-Edmunds. Mr. P.N.N. Symmott. Captain D.H. Hell-Thompson. Mr. G.C.E. Dodie. Brigadier J.R.C. Hamilton. Brigedier Lel. Wansbrough-Jones. Mt. Col. M. W. Charteris. Mr. B. F. Picknett. Mr. F.C. Rennie. Air Commodore Errois Group Captain V.H.B. Rothe Mr. B.A.B. Berrows. Mr. P. Garran. Mr. J.G.S. Brith. Mr. J.G. Edportson.



INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

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En Cleir

FROM PALESTINE (Gen 45 NOV 1947)

D. 20th November, 1947. R. 20th " 12,00 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2213.

Addressed S. of S. Repeated UKDED, New York (please pass as my telegram No. 1604).

Reference my telegram No. 2210 to you repeated No. 1600 to UKDEL.

Paragraph 5 does not of course apply to paragraph 4.

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for petranamission to New York),

Cooles sent to: /

271

Copies sent to:-

Cabinet Offices Ministry of Defence Treasury

Admi rel ty

War Office

" (M.O.4.) Ministry of Transport

Air Ministry

Foreign Office

M. I. 5.

Mr. S. B. V. Luke.

Brigadier Cornwall-Jones.

Commander Everahed. Mr. A.J. Newling. Mr. D.F.C. Elunt.

Mr. W. Russell-Edmmds.

Mr. P. N. N. Synnott. Captain Maunsell.

Capt. D. H. Hall-Thompson.

- Mr. G.C.B. Dodds.

Brig. J. R. C. Hemilton.

- Rwig. L.L. Wanabrough-Jones.

Lt. Col. M. M. Charteris.

- Mr. B.F. Picknett.

Mr. F.C. Remie.

- Air Commodore Brook.

Gp. Capt. V. H. B. Roth. Mr. B. A. B. Eurrows.

mr. P. Garran.

- Mr. J.G.S. Beith.

- Mr. J.C. Robertson.

INWARD TELEGRAM

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunninghem)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 22nd November, 1947. R. 22nd

25.00 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2238 Top Secret and Personal.

Addressed U.K.D.E.L. New York No. 1622. Repeated to the S. of S.

Two points have occurred to me which may help you in dealing with the problem of transfer of authority to the United Nations Commission. If it is suggested that we would be making things difficult for the Commission by insisting that they should not arrive until shortly before termination of present administration, it could be explained that we should see no objection to their being preceded by United Nations Organization Secretariat staff who could acquaint themselves with the problems involved in transfer and could discuss these with our officers on their own level. Some preparatory stops of this kind would seem necessary in any case and there would not be the same Arab objection to it as to the Commission itself.

I presume Commission and its staff would be paid for by U.N.O.

3. Secondly, I contemplate as you are aware that appointments of all officers serving present equinated and our be terminated at extempore date of its withdrawal and our obligations to them liquidated. Unless however arrangements are made to ascertain whether Pelestinian officers are propared to

omination

continue serving under commission, the Commission may quite well find itself without any local staff at all. It is very unlikely that any Arab officers who form over sixty per cent of the non expatriate staff will be so prepared.

4. For these two reasons I would suggest that it is in Commissions own interest not to press for too early arrival in Palestine so as to give time for enquiries regarding staff to be made and Secretariat officers to find their feet. This must surely be clear to engone taking a realistic approach to administration assuming responsibility for Government of Palestine. Presumably the Commission would be financially responsible for whatever terms might be offered.

5. I recognise that these coministrative problems have become obscured by the political missme in which discussions have taken place between disputants to whom edministrative considerations are secondary to politics but they are vital to the continuence of any orderly administration.

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for onward transmission)

Distributed to:

R. 243

R. 243

Mr. Trafford Smith

Mr. Gutch

Mr. Holding

Foreign Office

Mr. Hartin

Mr. Trafford Smith

Mr. Gutch

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Mr. Galeworthy

Mr. Holding

Mr. Gibson

Mr. B. A. B. Burrows,

Mr. g. y. S. Keitl

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INWARD TELEGRAM

Jes Jes

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S. COLONIES.

D. 23rd November, 1947. R. 23rd **

IMMEDIATE

No. 2239 Top Secreta

~ - 1.0V 1947

Addressed to U.K.D.E.L. New York No. 1623 (S. of S. please pass).

Repeated to the S. of S.

18.00 hrs.

Your telegram No. 3496 to the Foreign Office.

Our views on actual process of withdrawal are given in my telegrams Nos. 1600 and 1621 to New York (2210 and 2237 to the Colonial Office) on assumption that date of the termination of the mendate would be loth May. I should hope to meintain civil administration in all areas up to about that date. Whether this will be practicable will depend upon events and cannot be predicted. I again emphasise that evacuation of an area by the military forces does not necessarily entail withdrawal of civil administration. For example, it is necessary to maintain civil administration in the Gaza district to keep the railway running, if for no other reason.

2. First stage of withdrawal of military forces would be from Gaza district and not from Jewish areas. Second stage (March - May) would be withdrawal of forces from all areas except part of Samaria and Galilee and Haifa enclave. These plans do not fformulate any distinction between "contiguous" areas and others, military requirements of operation of withdrawal being paramount.

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R. 243
Secretary of State
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Mr. Gelsworthy
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Mr. Dale Foreign Office

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| 1 2 3 4 5 6 | Reference:- FO 371 6188

Sargest to Mr dongles reply further to Dec. 3
(BEITH)

lague.

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1 (095) 16 NOV

The AMERICAN AMBASSADOR asked me two questions about Palestine to-day.

Palestine settlement, would H.M.G. still wish to return her mandate as soon as possible? I said that we had decided to complete the withdrawal of our troops by August 1st and were now starting on a process of evacuation. I have no reason to think that we should postpone or alter this decision because the Assembly had in the meantime failed to agree on a settlement.

Mr. Douglas persumed that if the present plan failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority in the Assembly the Palestine Committee would be instructed to work out some other scheme which the Assembly could consider in a special session called for that purpose.

2. Did I think that in the absence of a decision of the Assembly the Zionists were likely to take the law between into their own hands and set up a Jewish state. I said that this was a hypothetical question which it was difficult to answer but I offered to consult the High Commissioner in Palestine on the subject though he probably would hesitate to give an opinion on a question which depended so much on the circumstances in which the Assembly left the Palestine problem.

5.F. Carrent

21st November 1947.

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OUT FILE

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1..

21st November, 1947.

E11093 |951 | 31 SECRET

The United States Ambassador asked Sargent to-day whether he thought that, in the absence of a decision of the Assembly on Palestine, the Zionists were likely to take the law into their own hands and set up a Jewish State. Sargent said this was a hypothetical question which it was difficult to answer, but offered to consult the High Commissioner for Palestine. He indicated that the latter would probably hesitate to give an opinion on a question which depended so much on the circumstances in which the Assembly left the Palestine problem.

Could you very kindly telegraph to the High Commissioner for an expression of opinion on this point? We can then consider what further answer, if any, to give to the United States Ambassador.

(Signed) B.A.B. BURROWS.

Trafford Smith, Esq. Colonial Office.

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TELEGRAM Cypher (O.T.P.) FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham) TO S. OF S., COLONIES. D. 25th November, 1947. R. 25th 13.00 hrs. No. 2254 Top Secret and Personal. Your telegram No. 2934. On the assumption given in your telegrem and on the assumption that the Mandate would be terminated not later than 15th May (not let August) it may be considered certain that the Jewa will proclaim and establish a Jewish State in Palestine immediately on the termination of the Mandate and unlikely that they would so so before this. In a recent interview, Bon Gurlon told me that the Jews recognised that the Paleatine Government could not depart from the status que while it is still in being, I cannot myself see that the Agency could hope to gain any substantial advantage from a coup d'etat before the Mandate is terminated. Instead, I believe that they will make every preparation for the establishment of Jewish Government without actually proclaiming it. This may once have been a country of prophets but I have now had experience enough here not to count myself amongst them?

Mr. Martin

Mr. Gutch

Mr. Highem

Mr. Holmer

Mr. Gibson Mr. Dale

Mr. Burrows.

Mr. Mathicaon

Mr. Gelsworthy.

Mr. Trafford Smith

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Sir T. Lloyd

Sir S. Caine

Mr. Holding

Secretary of State

Mr. Rees-Williams

Sir C. Jostrica

Foreign Office

R. 243

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

174

75872/154/22/47 Cypher (0.T.P.)

TO PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.

Sent 22nd November, 1947. 14,45 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 2934 Top Secret and Personal.

United States Ambassador has asked Foreign Office whether, in absence of decision on Palestine by General Assembly. Jews are likely to attempt to set up State in Palestine by coup d'etat. He has been told that it is difficult to answer such a hypothetical question but that you may be able to offer an opinion which would necessarily be tentative on a problem depending so much on the circumstances in which the Assembly failed to make a recommendation.

- 2. Grateful for your views on the assumptions that:-
- (a) the ad hoc Committee endorses partition plan by simple majority but plan fails to secure two thirds majority in Assembly which reaches stalemate; and that
- (b) we refuse to implement any plan not agreed by Jews and Araba and adhere to our programme of withdrawing troops and administration by let August, 1948.

When your views are received the desirability of giving a further answer to the United States Ambassador will be considered.

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175° END ()

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R. 245
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
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Mr. B. A. B. Burrows. Mr. Beith.

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